United States v. Díaz
670 F.3d 332
1st Cir.2012Background
- Indicted Diaz, Rodríguez-Romero, Rodríguez, and López-Capó for conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of protected areas in Carioca, a Puerto Rico public housing project.
- Counts include conspiracy (Count One) and substantive drug counts (Counts Two–Five); Count Six charged a firearms conspiracy, Count Seven sought forfeiture.
- Government relied on three cooperating witnesses, police surveillance, and a forensic chemist to prove distribution and quantities within Carioca.
- Diaz was an enforcer; Rodríguez-Romero and Rodríguez were runners/sellers; López-Capó was an owner/supplier tied to crack distribution.
- Verdicts: Diaz convicted on Counts One–Five; Rodríguez-Romero and Rodríguez convicted on Counts One–Five; López-Capó convicted on Counts One and Three.
- Rodríguez challenges include jurisdiction under the FJDA due to juvenile status during much of the conspiracy; Rodríguez-Romero and López-Capó challenge evidentiary and sentencing rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the 1,000-foot proximity proven for the schoolyard counts? | Diaz and López-Capó contend evidence fails 1,000-foot proof and proper definitions. | Government proved Carioca operated within public housing; distance can be inferred by common-sense proximity. | Yes; 1,000-foot requirement met and Carioca established as public housing; proximity proven without precise measurement. |
| Does the FJDA confer jurisdiction over Rodriguez for post-majority acts in the conspiracy and substantive counts? | Rodríguez asserts no post-majority jurisdiction due to pre-majority conspiracy acts and lack of AG certification. | Government argues post-majority participation supports conspiracy jurisdiction; Pinkerton bases may apply for co-conspirator acts. | Conspiracy post-majority jurisdiction valid; substantive heroin/cocaine counts lack post-majority proof; some counts vacated. |
| Is Rodríguez liable for co-conspirator offenses under Pinkerton after ratifying post-majority participation? | Rodríguez contends no liability for co-conspirator offenses committed before or after turning eighteen without proper post-majority proof. | Pinkerton liability may apply for reasonably foreseeable offenses in furtherance of the conspiracy post-majority. | Crack count upheld under Pinkerton theory; heroin/cocaine counts lacking post-majority evidence; liability limited accordingly. |
| Did the district court commit sentencing errors for López-Capó (enhancements, recency points, 3553(a) factors)? | López-Capó argues misapplied enhancements, improper recency points, and insufficient 3553(a) consideration. | Government defends enhancements and CHC calculation; notes amendment timing and court’s rationale. | No reversible error; enhancements and CHC calculation upheld; Amendment 742 not retroactive; sentencing explained within 3553(a) framework. |
| Were López-Capó’s hearsay/impeachment and other evidentiary rulings proper, including multiple-conspiracy instruction denial? | López-Capó asserts evidentiary errors affected defense and requests for multiple-conspiracy instruction. | Court crediting Rule 403 balancing and co-conspirator statements properly admitted under 801(d)(2)(E). | Evidentiary rulings upheld; no abuse of discretion; multiple-conspiracy instruction not required given the record. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146 (1st Cir. 2002) (distance proof under 1,000 feet requires precision unless reasonable proximity exists)
- Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2010) (evidence sufficiency and proximity standards in schoolyard statute context)
- Vargas-De Jesús, 618 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2010) (FJDA jurisdiction when pre-majority acts and post-majority ratification; certification requirement)
- Welch, 15 F.3d 1202 (1st Cir. 1993) (jurisdictional decisions and pre/post-majority conspiracy analysis)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (Supreme Court 1946) (co-conspirator liability for offenses in furtherance of conspiracy)
- Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2008) (co-conspirator statements and admissibility under 801(d)(2)(E))
- Pelletier, 845 F.2d 1126 (1st Cir. 1988) (co-conspirator statements admissibility in furtherance of conspiracy)
- Adams, 640 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2011) (Retroactivity and remand considerations for guideline amendments)
- Turibides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2006) (brief sentencing explanations acceptable under 3553(a))