United States v. Craig Stanley Toll
804 F.3d 1344
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Craig Toll was CFO of InnoVida, which primarily sold "factories in a box"; Toll and owner Claudio Osorio prepared two sets of unaudited financial statements that reported markedly different profitability depending on revenue recognition method.
- One set (official ledger) used deferred revenue and showed large losses; the other set, labeled “pro forma,” recognized revenue immediately and showed substantial profits. The pro forma statements were given to investors, the board, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
- InnoVida used investor and OPIC funds for improper purposes (repaying other investors, funding Osorio’s personal account). Toll submitted false documents and altered/forged emails to OPIC about contracts and equity contributions.
- Lewis Carness, InnoVida’s controller, testified about the two sets of statements and that he believed the deferred-revenue set complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), while the pro forma set did not. The district court allowed this lay testimony.
- A jury convicted Toll of multiple counts: two conspiracies to commit wire fraud, three wire fraud counts, one major fraud against the United States, three false-statement counts to a federal agency, and one conspiracy to engage in monetary transactions with criminally derived property; six wire-fraud counts were acquitted. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Toll) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of controller Carness’s testimony about GAAP compliance | Testimony was factual or lay opinion based on Carness’s particularized knowledge as controller and thus admissible under Rules 602/701 | Testimony required expert qualification under Rule 702 because GAAP compliance is technical/specialized | Court: no abuse of discretion; testimony concerned Carness’s factual belief and particularized lay knowledge, so admissible under Rule 701 |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy to defraud private investors | Circumstantial evidence (preparation/selection/use of two statement sets, presentations to investors/board, false repayment documentation) shows Toll knowingly participated | Toll claimed isolation from Osorios, lack of intent to mislead, and no direct enrichment; argued government failed to prove GAAP violation or his knowledge | Court: sufficient evidence; Toll’s role in preparing and distributing pro forma statements and conduct supported inference of knowing participation |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy to defraud OPIC / false-document submissions | Toll sent pro forma statements and false documents to OPIC, reversed ledger entries, asked staff to ‘‘improve’’ documents, and forwarded altered contract emails—supporting knowledge and causation | Toll conceded falsity but argued he didn’t know documents were fabricated or cause their submission | Court: sufficient evidence that Toll knew documents were false and caused/submitted them; materiality established because documents could influence OPIC decisions |
| Sufficiency for related convictions (wire fraud, major fraud, §1957 conspiracy, §1001 false statements) | Same record (false statements/documents, distribution to investors/OPIC, misuse of funds) supports each statutory element | Toll challenged knowledge, participation, causation, and materiality where applicable | Court: affirmed convictions; evidence viewed in government’s favor permitted reasonable inferences of guilt on each count |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir.) (standard for reviewing admission of lay testimony)
- Citizens for Police Accountability Political Comm. v. Browning, 572 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion standard)
- United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir.) (plain-error review when no timely objection)
- United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.) (sufficiency-of-evidence standard for criminal convictions)
- United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942 (11th Cir.) (Rule 701 and lay witness testimony based on particularized knowledge)
- Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir.) (business officer’s particularized knowledge supports lay opinion)
- United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423 (11th Cir.) (slight participation can sustain conspiracy conviction)
- Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005) (no overt act required for §1956(h) conspiracy)
- United States v. Nolan, 223 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir.) (scope of major-fraud statute covering execution of contracts)
- United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (materiality standard for false-statement statutes)
- United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir.) (permitting inference of knowledge from circumstantial evidence)