CITIZENS FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL COMMITTEE, FLORIDA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE v. KURT S. BROWNING, in his capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Florida, SHARON L. HARRINGTON, in her official capacity as Supervisor of Elections, Lee County
No. 08-15115
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
June 25, 2009
[PUBLISH] D. C. Docket No. 08-00635-CV-FTM-29SPC
(June 25, 2009)
PER CURIAM:
This appeal is about voting. Florida Statute
Background
Plaintiff Citizens for Police Accountability Political Committee is a political action committee in the State of Florida. Plaintiff Florida State Conference of the NAACP is the parent organization of 60 Florida branches of the national NAACP. Plaintiffs support an amendment to the Fort Myers, Florida, city charter that would create a citizen oversight panel for the city police department. To place the charter amendment on a ballot, though, Plaintiffs must gather signatures from “10 percent of the [city‘s] registered electors as of the last preceding municipal general election.”
In January 2008, Plaintiff Citizens for Police Accountability Political Committee tried to solicit signatures from voters leaving a polling place in Fort Myers.3 Although the proposed charter amendment related to nothing then on the ballot, election officials, in accordance with the Florida statute, banned the signature-gatherers from soliciting voters within 100 feet of the polling place. Plaintiffs say that many voters were able to park, vote, and leave without interacting with the signature-gatherers.
Then in August 2008, Plaintiffs filed suit and sought injunctive relief under
The district court held oral argument just before the August election. The next day, the district court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the State from enforcing the Florida statute against Plaintiffs at polling places on election day.4 The district court concluded that the Florida statute was probably unconstitutional as it applied to Plaintiffs’ exit-solicitation efforts because the State had produced little evidence that the exit-solicitation ban was necessary to serve a compelling interest or that it was sufficiently drawn to achieve that end. The State appeals.5
Standard of Review
We review a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination,
Discussion
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy.” McDonald‘s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem‘l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)). To secure an injunction, a party must prove four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury absent an injunction; (3) the injury outweighs whatever damage an injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) an injunction is not adverse to the public interest. Id.
The State challenges on appeal only the district court‘s conclusion that Plaintiffs established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Florida statute is unconstitutional as it applies to exit-solicitation efforts. The State admits that the Florida statute infringes some on Plaintiffs’ right to engage in political speech6 (see Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1892 (1988)) but contends that the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored to protect the, at least, equally critical right to vote free from intimidation, interference, and fraud.
In Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), the Supreme Court addressed the facial constitutionality of a Tennessee statute that proscribed campaign activity within 100 feet of a polling place.7 Id. at 1848. Considering the Tennessee statute as a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the statute could survive only if it was “necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and was “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id. at 1851 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass‘n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983)).
The Supreme Court upheld the Tennessee statute.8 In doing so, a plurality of the Supreme Court9 first reviewed whether
The plurality then turned to whether the Tennessee statute was necessary to serve those compelling interests. In typical cases involving strict-scrutiny review, the Supreme Court would look to the state to offer evidence that the pertinent statute is necessary to promote the compelling interest. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013, 1021-23 (1989). But in Burson, the plurality required Tennessee to produce no evidence of necessity. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1856. Instead, the plurality relied on the long history of regulation to combat election misconduct, the substantial consensus in favor of a secret ballot secured by a campaign-free zone that emerged from that history, and common sense to conclude “that some restricted zone around the voting area” was necessary to secure Tennessee‘s compelling interests. Id. (emphasis in original).
The plurality last examined whether the Tennessee statute was narrowly tailored. To pass this test, a state normally must show that the pertinent statute used the least restrictive means available to serve the compelling interest. See Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1168 (1988). The plurality recognized, however, that it faced a unique situation because of the importance of protecting the right to vote and the difficulties in and dangers of requiring Tennessee to demonstrate the effects of its statute on political stability.10 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1856-57. So the plurality departed from the customary analysis and applied a modified “burden of proof” under which the Tennessee statute was sufficiently tailored if it was “reasonable” and did not ”significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.” Id. at 1857 (emphasis in original). The plurality concluded that the minor geographic limitation in the Tennessee statute -- 100 feet -- satisfied this more lenient standard. Id. The statute was constitutional.
The parties dispute the extent to which Burson affects this case. The State says that the Florida statute is no different than the Tennessee statute in Burson and, thus, the Florida statute should survive for the same reasons. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that the facts in Burson are materially different because there a campaign worker wanted to solicit votes on election day, while here Plaintiffs aim only to seek the supporting signatures of voters -- who had already voted -- about a non-ballot issue.
We accept that Burson does not bind us here; the material facts are different in some ways. Nevertheless, we believe that the Burson plurality opinion is highly persuasive;
1. Compelling Interest
Under the Burson plurality‘s standard, we must first examine whether the State has a compelling interest to support its statute. The State contends that it shares the same compelling interests as Tennessee in Burson: (1) protecting voters from confusion and undue influence; and (2) preserving the integrity of the election process. Plaintiffs take no issue with the presence or legitimacy of those compelling interests in this case. Nor do we.
2. Necessity
Having identified the pertinent compelling interests, we turn to the more difficult question of whether the Florida statute is necessary to serve those interests. The State claims that it need not produce evidence of exit solicitors intimidating voters or interfering with the election process to prove necessity. Instead, the State asserts that it, like Tennessee in Burson, may rely on our country‘s long history of election regulation, the widespread agreement that emerged from that history, and common sense to show that the ban on exit solicitation within 100 feet of a polling place is necessary to promote its compelling interests.
Plaintiffs criticize this approach. They say that exit solicitation is a peaceful, non-disruptive activity targeting only those voters who have already voted11 and claim that this “already-voted” feature distinguishes their conduct from the more intimidating, violent, and unsavory behavior talked about in the Burson plurality opinion.12 Plaintiffs, therefore, argue that the State may not rely on the historical evidence of election abuse discussed in the Burson plurality opinion but must instead offer its own proof that the ban on exit solicitation in the Florida statute is necessary. Echoing the district court, Plaintiffs say that the State has produced no such evidence.
About history, we agree with the State. We simply cannot accept that exit solicitation is so different from the other political conduct highlighted in Burson to compel a different result here. As we see it, commotion tied to exit solicitation is as capable of intimidating and confusing the electorate and impeding the voting process -- even deterring potential voters from coming to the polls -- as other kinds of political canvassing or political action around the polls.
But even in Plaintiffs’ imagined perfect world when absolutely only those people who have voted are solicited, our belief does not waiver. The State wants peace and order around its polling places, and we accord significant value to that desire for it preserves the integrity and dignity of the voting process and encourages people to come and to vote. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 636, 640 (1999) (acknowledging that “there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes“) (quoting Storer, 94 S. Ct. at 1279); Clean Up ‘84 v. Heinrich, 759 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (“We recognize that the state has a significant interest in protecting the orderly functioning of the election process. It must ensure its voters that they may exercise their franchise without distraction, interruption, or harassment.“). Given the example of history, if exit solicitation must be allowed close to the polls, it takes little foresight to envision polling places awash with exit solicitors, some competing (albeit peacefully) for the attention of the same voters at the same time to discuss different issues or different sides of the same issue. And we accept it as probable that some -- maybe many -- voters faced with running the gauntlet will refrain from participating in the election process merely to avoid the resulting commotion when leaving the polls.14
The Burson plurality opinion teaches us that the State need not wait for actual interference or violence or intimidation to erupt near a polling place for the State to act.15 The State may take precautions to protect and to facilitate voting; and the
It is hard for State election officials to know the precise moment just before solicitation becomes interference in the election process. And if an election is disturbed, it is hard to know what the impact was on the election. The cost of a disturbed election is too high to allow the State only to react to disturbances but not to prevent disturbances. We, therefore, reject the contention that the State must offer its own evidence demonstrating that the ban on exit solicitation is necessary to serve its compelling interests; our country‘s long history of election regulation, the consensus emerging from that history, and the practical need to keep voters and voting undisturbed all prove that the ban is warranted.16
3. Narrowly Tailored
We last explore the breadth of the Florida statute. To prove that the Florida statute is narrowly tailored, the State must show that the Florida Statute is “reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.”17 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 107 S. Ct. 533, 537-38 (1986)) (emphasis added in Burson). The Florida statute mirrors in many respects -- including the size of the restricted zone -- the Tennessee statute upheld in Burson. And we conclude that the Florida statute is sufficiently tailored to satisfy the pertinent standard.
Conclusion
We accept that the right to engage in political discourse is “the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 85 S. Ct. 209, 216 (1964). But voting is about the most important thing there is. And as history has taught us, the right of political discourse is far from absolute: it must at times step aside so other freedoms similarly pivotal to our republic can thrive. The Florida statute, which balances the right to engage in political speech against the right to vote without interference and harassment, represents one of those times.
We stress the short time (a few days a year) and small area (less than a football field) in which the Florida statute suppresses some political speech around the polls; Plaintiffs are free to solicit signatures unencumbered most days a year and to solicit signatures outside the solicitation-free zone all days a year. And by the way, we are not alone in our decision: other courts, in cases involving petitions, have also upheld statutes establishing solicitation-free zones around polling places.18 We believe that the sanctity of
We, therefore, conclude today that the Florida statute does not violate the First Amendment by banning Plaintiffs from engaging in exit solicitation about a non-ballot issue within 100 feet of polling places in Florida. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting Plaintiffs a preliminary injunction.
REVERSED.
-17-
Notes
Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1856-57 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).Elections vary from year to year, and place to place. It is therefore difficult to make specific findings about the effects of a voting regulation. Moreover, the remedy for a tainted election is an imperfect one. Rerunning an election would have a negative impact on voter turnout. Thus, requiring proof that a 100-foot boundary is perfectly tailored to deal with voter intimidation and election fraud would necessitate that a State‘s political system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action.
