465 F.Supp.3d 854
N.D. Ind.2020Background
- In 2018 FBI traced online extortion/child-pornography activity to records linked to Defendant Bradley M. Cox; Cox admitted using multiple Facebook accounts to solicit/extort sexual material.
- Government obtained non-content Records from Facebook via an SCA § 2703(d) subpoena: registration, billing, session times/durations, IP addresses, and cookies (no account content).
- Cox moved to suppress the Records, arguing Carpenter v. United States requires a warrant for such third‑party records because they reveal location and intimate details.
- The Government relied on the traditional third‑party doctrine and post‑Carpenter cases distinguishing CSLI from IP/log data, arguing the Records were voluntarily disclosed and not equivalent to CSLI.
- The Court found Cox presented no admissible evidence or expert proof about the Records’ contents or how they were used; Cox’s assertions were largely speculative.
- The Court denied suppression: (1) concluded Carpenter did not control because Facebook logs are volitional and less precise than CSLI, and (2) alternatively held the Government acted in good faith reliance on binding precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Cox) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Facebook registration/billing/IP/cookie Records obtained via an SCA §2703(d) subpoena are protected by the Fourth Amendment under Carpenter | The Records fall within the third‑party doctrine; IP/logs are generated volitionally (user action) and are not equivalent to CSLI, so no warrant was required | Carpenter’s exception to the third‑party doctrine applies; Facebook Records can reveal precise location and intimate details, so a warrant was required | Denied. Court held Carpenter did not extend to these Records: they were voluntarily disclosed and not materially like CSLI; third‑party doctrine applies |
| Whether suppression is required under the exclusionary rule (good‑faith exception) | Even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, agents reasonably relied on SCA and binding/persuasive precedent, so exclusion is not warranted | Carpenter and its remand should have put the Government on notice that a warrant was required under the SCA | Denied. Court found objective good faith reliance on then‑binding precedent; exclusionary rule inapplicable |
| Whether Cox carried his burden to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Records | — | The Records reveal exact/chronological location and intimate details; cookies can link third‑party activity; thus Cox had a privacy interest | Denied. Cox produced no admissible evidence or expert proof about the Records or how they were used; claims were speculative, so he failed to meet his burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (warrant required for historical cell‑site location information)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reasonable expectation of privacy / warrant rule)
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (third‑party doctrine; pen‑register data)
- United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (no warrant for recordings passed to third parties)
- United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no privacy interest in bank records held by bank)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good‑faith exception to exclusionary rule)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good‑faith reliance on statute can preclude exclusion)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (reliance on binding precedent bars exclusion)
- United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 97 (1st Cir. 2019) (IP address logs are volitional and differ from CSLI)
- United States v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2016) (government obtained only login IPs, which do not show location when not logged in)
- United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 2018) (business records that incidentally reveal location remain within third‑party doctrine)
