United States v. Cortrell Ramey
880 F.3d 447
8th Cir.2018Background
- Defendant Cortrell Ramey pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- At sentencing the district court applied USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) raising Ramey’s base offense level based on a prior felony conviction for Missouri second-degree assault, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.060.1(5) (2009).
- Ramey’s prior conviction was under subsection (5), which criminalizes recklessly causing physical injury by discharging a firearm.
- The Guidelines define a “crime of violence” to include offenses having as an element the “use ... of physical force against the person of another” (USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1)); the question was whether reckless discharge of a firearm satisfies the “use of force” requirement.
- Ramey argued reckless conduct does not constitute a “use” of force under the Guidelines; government relied on Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent treating reckless assaults with force as qualifying predicates.
- The district court treated the Missouri conviction as a qualifying crime of violence; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a conviction under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.060.1(5) is a "crime of violence" for USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) | Ramey: conviction is for reckless (not intentional) conduct, so it does not involve the "use" of physical force under the Guidelines | Government: reckless discharge causing injury by a firearm satisfies the Guidelines' "use of force" element; precedent treats reckless assaults as use of force | The panel affirmed: reckless discharge causing injury via firearm constitutes a "use" of force under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(1), so the prior conviction is a qualifying crime of violence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless assaults count as "use" of force for federal offenses addressing domestic-violence misdemeanors)
- United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2016) (reckless conduct constitutes "use" of force under the ACCA; follows Voisine)
- United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2011) (held reckless driving causing serious injury was not a crime of violence under Guidelines' force clause; limited to unadorned reckless driving)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (construed the ACCA residual clause, limiting scope of crimes qualifying as violent felonies)
- United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2012) (applied Ossana in holding reckless driving causing serious injury not a Guidelines crime of violence)
- United States v. Boose, 739 F.3d 1185 (8th Cir. 2014) (followed Ossana in similar context)
- United States v. Fields, 863 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2017) (post-Voisine discussion of force-clause boundaries)