United States v. Cortez Rogers
961 F.3d 291
| 4th Cir. | 2020Background:
- Rogers previously pleaded guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced with a term of supervised release.
- About a month into supervision he fled from a controlled heroin buy, led a high-speed chase, and was later convicted in state court; the probation officer petitioned to revoke federal supervised release.
- At the revocation hearing Rogers admitted the violation; parties jointly recommended 24 months’ imprisonment; the court orally imposed 24 months’ custody followed by 12 months’ supervised release but did not announce any supervised-release conditions in open court.
- Weeks later the district court’s written judgment listed 26 supervised-release conditions: 4 statutory mandatory conditions and 22 discretionary “standard” conditions adopted from a Western District standing order.
- Rogers appealed, arguing the 22 discretionary conditions are void because they were not pronounced orally at sentencing; the government defended the conditions and argued they could be incorporated via the standing order.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard of review for an inconsistent written judgment | Rogers: de novo review because he had no opportunity to object at sentencing | Government: plain-error review because Rogers did not object below | Court: de novo — defendant lacked opportunity to object, so compare transcript and judgment anew |
| Must statutory (mandatory) supervised-release conditions be pronounced orally? | Rogers: not the central dispute; treated as valid regardless | Government: mandatory conditions valid without oral pronouncement | Court: mandatory § 3583(d) conditions need not be orally pronounced and remain part of sentence |
| Must discretionary supervised-release conditions be pronounced orally? | Rogers: yes — discretionary conditions require oral pronouncement when imposed | Government: they can be included later or by incorporation | Court: yes — any non-mandatory (discretionary) condition must be pronounced in open court (or expressly incorporated at sentencing) |
| Did the district court’s oral statement and subsequent standing order incorporation satisfy the pronouncement requirement here? | Rogers: no — court made no express incorporation at sentencing, so conditions are not part of the oral sentence | Government: oral imposition of an "additional term of supervision" plus written standing order suffices to incorporate conditions | Court: no — the court did not expressly incorporate the standing order at sentencing, so the 22 discretionary conditions conflict with the oral sentence; vacated and remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Anstice, 930 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2019) (requires oral announcement of non‑mandatory supervised‑release conditions)
- United States v. Johnson, 765 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2014) (compare sentencing transcript with written judgment to resolve inconsistencies)
- United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2001) (defendant has right to be present at sentencing; oral pronouncement protects that right)
- United States v. Handakas, 329 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2003) (oral sentence controls when judgment later adds conditions not pronounced in court)
- United States v. Morse, 344 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1965) (oral sentence controls over conflicting written order)
- United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670 (4th Cir. 2020) (discretionary/special conditions require explanation showing relation to statutory factors)
- United States v. Cabello, 916 F.3d 543 (5th Cir. 2019) (distinguishes mandatory § 3583(d) conditions from discretionary ones)
- United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006) (different approach: some discretionary "standard" conditions may be implied without oral announcement)
- United States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002) (allows certain written clarifications of oral sentences in limited categories)