Case Information
*1 Before H AMILTON S CUDDER S T . E VE , Circuit Judges . S CUDDER Circuit Judge
. Christopher pleaded guilty conspiring distribute methamphetamine sentenced ten years’ imprisonment years’ On challenges su pervised appearing judgment convic tion sentenc ing. Because three challenged *2 ‐ statute and discretionary, af ‐ fi rm and otherwise remand.
I
Prior the prepared a Presen ‐ tence Investigation Report, commonly referred as a PSR. The PSR recommend a fi ve year supervised and included proposed plan listing multiple conditions. Five appeared under the label “mandatory.” The PSR also recommended dozen or so ‐ tions, categorized as either standard special
Sentencing began the court fi rming with had received the PSR and reviewed it counsel. After announcing ten year custodial sen tence, turned supervised release, explaining law fi ve year term. See 841(b). As release, judge im posed but one standard special conditions, stat ing: “I adopt Condition Nos. through [the standard conditions], through [the special conditions], as pro posed justi fi ed presentence report.” At no point, though, address ve PSR cat egorized “mandatory.”
The ensuing judgment, often shorthanded fed eral criminal practice “J&C” (Judgment Commit ment Order), included appeared “mandatory” PSR. The J&C included under heading Manda Conditions.” J&C separately listed special had sen tencing. *3 3
On Anstice contends that conditions ap pearing “Statutory Mandatory Conditions” wri tt en judgment were not imposed sentencing there fore are sentence.
II start from familiar rule that “[i]f an inconsistency
exists between an oral later wri tt en sentence, sen tence pronounced bench controls.” United States v. Alburay F.3d 782, (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bonanno F.3d (7th Cir. 1998)). And “any new conditions imposed later wri tt en judgment incon sistent court’s oral order vacated.” Johnson F.3d (7th Cir. 2014). John son provides good example. there “un ambiguously several speci c release” “did include statement to whether would apply,” leading us to vacate additional ap peared only Id.
While our caselaw clear oral controls, have never addressed whether court’s failure made manda statute—as opposed non conditions— renders those nullities. This case presents question.
While court’s judgment characterized listed each Anstice challenges it turns out those neither statutory nor mandatory. Those conditions—the requirement *4 of his prohi ‐ bition his possessing or other weapon—do appear mandatory in § 3583(d). Nor are we aware of any other source of law requiring imposition of these
Resolving requires we distin guish between these conditions—which are required by statute—and three included under heading in tt la tt er three appear § 3583(d) thus truly mandatory.
A begin with three required by 3583(d) properly characterized judg
ment. Those (1) prohibit Anstice from commi ing another federal, state, local crime; (2) bar him illegally controlled substance; (3) require his cooper ation collection DNA sample.
That these three statutorily im portant. It means had no discretion regarding whether impose them: they part And, like criminal de fendants, Anstice had notice he subject these manda because they appear 3583(d). They were also included PSR, which rmed at sentenc ing had received reviewed counsel. circumstances, conclude three tions 3583(d) were val idly even though failed them sentencing. No circuit *5 18 3171 5 have considered question has reached a contrary conclu sion. See, e.g. , United States v. Vasquez Puente , 922 F.3d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Drapeau , F.3d 646, (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Napier F.3d (9th Cir. 2006); Vega Ortiz F.3d 22–23 (1st Cir. 2005).
B
This brings us remaining two release appearing as This listing erroneous, neither condition—that (1) (2) refrain other weapon— appears 3583(d). Nor they described mandated statute Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. 5D1.3(a). short, these two discretionary.
As commonplace sensible these two may be across sentences, Congress has their imposition. If district does choose impose them, they must announced at sentencing. See Johnson F.3d at 711. That happen here. To contrary, several condi tions hearing without saying anything about these So have circumstance where oral sentence fl icts vacate these tions. See id. has ample authority impose remand. See id. ; 3583(e)(2).
C
With today’s decision, we emphasize the sound and prudent approach is for the district to pronounce of supervised release, even those mandated by statute. recognizing certain required by 3583(d) necessarily of of super vised release, we intend to displace this practice, which serves to rm the defendant aware of the to which will subject on supervised release. end an administrative observation regarding the supervised release form contained the
form J&C (form AO B) used the Western District of Wis consin. form erroneously includes Manda highlighted this opinion by 3583(d)—speci cally, require ment for defendant to to of custody prohibition on de fendant weapon while release. To allow district to modify form correct this error, we di rect our Clerk Court send opinion to Clerk Western District Wisconsin.
For reasons, AFFIRM court’s imposi tion 3583(d), VACATE non mandatory additional provided judgment, REMAND allow modify reconsider respect non