United States v. Conley
342 F. Supp. 3d 247
D. Conn.2018Background
- On May 5, 2017 police recovered heroin/fentanyl bags and a cell phone at the scene of an overdose death; texts on that phone (the "Targeted Phone") suggested drug transactions.
- Toll/call-frequency analysis identified frequent callers; two individuals ("Frequent Callers") told police they bought heroin from a man called "D.L." who drove a white Infiniti SUV and frequented Elliot St./Sylvan Ave.
- Surveillance on May 17–18 observed a white Infiniti behaving evasively and a hand-to-hand style contact between a black male (later identified as Conley) and a green Subaru. Officers stopped the Infiniti while Conley drove it.
- While Conley was escorted to the rear of the car (not handcuffed), an agent called the Targeted Phone, heard a phone ring in the driver-side door pocket, and officers seized three phones found there (Cell Phones 1–3). Conley was then arrested.
- Warrants to search the phones were obtained June 12 (for Phones 1–3) and an additional warrant for Phone 1 on August 17; Phones 1 and 3 were ultimately searched and produced evidence.
- Conley moved to suppress on multiple Fourth Amendment grounds (illegal stop; unlawful arrest; calling the phone as a search; seizure and searches of phones; warrant overbreadth and delay). The court held an evidentiary hearing and denied both suppression motions.
Issues
| Issue | Conley’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of the vehicle stop | Stop lacked reasonable suspicion: informant tips were insufficiently specific; driving/touches not suspicious | Totality: corroborated informant info + surveillance and observed hand-to-hand contact provided reasonable suspicion | Stop was lawful — reasonable suspicion existed; collective knowledge imputes surveillance team’s facts to stopping officers |
| Whether the initial detention at rear of vehicle was an arrest | Detention amounted to an arrest (secured at rear) requiring probable cause | It remained a Terry stop; arrest occurred only after agents called the Targeted Phone and heard ringing | Not an arrest at that time; later arrest after ringing was supported by probable cause |
| Calling Targeted Phone before seizure: search? | Dialing was a warrantless search of phone (invaded privacy) | Calling was not a "search" under Fourth Amendment; agents were lawfully present and phone in plain view/ audible | Calling did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search; Fourth Amendment not implicated by the call |
| Seizure and searches of Cell Phones 1–3 (probable cause, warrants, and suppression) | Seizure of multiple phones, and later broad warrants, lacked probable cause/particularity; delay in obtaining warrants unreasonable; overbroad warrants | Cell Phone 1 was the Targeted Phone (rang when called) -> probable cause; facts supported probable cause for Phone 3; delays were explainable; even if warrants defective, good-faith exception applies | Seizure of Phones 1 and 3 supported by probable cause; June and August warrants lacked particularity (did not clearly identify crimes on the warrant face), but suppression not required because officers acted in objectively reasonable good faith; Motion denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (cell phones implicate heightened privacy interests)
- Arizona v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (reasonable-suspicion totality-of-the-circumstances test)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (informant-tip reliability and corroboration under totality of the circumstances)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
- Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (warrant particularity required on warrant face)
- United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72 (warrant so lacking in stated crime that reliance unreasonable)
- United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56 (good-faith application where unincorporated affidavit made purposes clear and affiant executed search)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (probable cause standard for warrantless arrests)