United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513

Consolidated challenges to the Adam Walsh Act's civil commitment provision, 18 U.S.C. § 4248, after the district court held it unconstitutional on power and due process grounds; Fourth Circuit initially affirmed on power grounds but the Supreme Court reversed on authority and remanded for due process review.
Statute allows certification of a person as sexually dangerous and initiation of a civil commitment hearing if the person is in federal custody or meets specified conditions; hearing includes counsel, potential expert evaluations, and the possibility of discharge or transfer.
The Act requires three fact findings by clear and convincing evidence: (i) engagement in sexually violent conduct or child molestation (prior bad act), (ii) serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder, and (iii) that the condition would cause serious difficulty refraining from such conduct if released.
The district court conducted procedures including appointment of counsel, subpoenas for witnesses, and two competing expert evaluations for each respondent; it also addressed possible discharge and post-commitment reporting requirements.
Respondents Comstock, Vigil, Matherly, Revland, and Catron were certified while in federal custody; Catron's path included an initial § 4246 mental-disease certificate before switching to § 4248.
The issues were preserved for review; the Supreme Court remanded to evaluate due process challenges consistent with Addington and Hendricks.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Must prior bad act be proven beyond a reasonable doubt?	Respondents argue Winship requires the higher standard.	Government contends civil commitment uses a different standard; not beyond a reasonable doubt.	Clear and convincing evidence suffices; not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
Is § 4248's three factual prerequisites constitutionally permissible under Addington/Hendricks?	Respondents challenge the two-prong and three-prong structure as unconstitutional due to due process.	Government defends the Addington framework and evidentiary balance, including prior acts as evidentiary, not punitive, indicators.	The three-prong framework is constitutionally permissible; it aligns with civil commitment goals and Supreme Court precedent.
Does the Act's civil nature require criminal-standard protections?	Respondents urge criminal-process protections due to past conduct evidence.	Statute remains civil in purpose; not require criminal burdens; prior acts serve evidentiary purposes.	Civil commitment can rely on clear and convincing evidence; does not require the criminal standard.

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (U.S. 1979) (clear and convincing evidence suffices for civil commitment)
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1997) (prior acts may be evidentiary in civil commitment without converting to criminal proceedings)
United States v. Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt required in juvenile delinquency; not controlling for civil commitment)
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (U.S. 1986) (declined criminal procedures in civil commitment when nonpunitive)
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (U.S. 1993) (civil commitment standards reflect the differing nature of the liberty interest)
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (U.S. 2008) (plainly legitimate sweep of statute supports facial validity; limited counterarguments)