United States v. Colon-De Jesus, 85 F.4th 15

Background

In 2014 Colón was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm as a prohibited person and sentenced to 60 months plus 3 years supervised release; supervised-release conditions forbade new crimes, drug use, and possession of firearms/ammunition.
In 2019 police arrested Colón and seized a Glock modified into a machinegun, an AK-style pistol, multiple high-capacity magazines, over 300 rounds of ammunition, and 18 capsules that field-tested positive for cocaine; he pleaded guilty in case 19-771 to unlawful possession of a machinegun and received 41 months plus 3 years supervised release.
Revocation proceedings on his earlier supervised release followed; at the final hearing Colón (through counsel) accepted the violations and the court found a Grade A violation. The court recited facts (including the PSR’s drug-seizure allegation) and heard arguments on sentencing.
The district court considered the advisory policy statement range (18–24 months) and the § 3553(a) factors, emphasized repeated firearms possession while on supervision and failure to rehabilitate, and imposed the statutory-maximum 24-month revocation sentence.
On appeal Colón challenged the sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable, arguing (inter alia) that the court relied on unsubstantiated drug allegations and erred in finding he was “dealing in cocaine.”
The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting procedural-error claims under plain-error review (Colón preserved only limited objections) and concluding the within-range 24‑month sentence was substantively reasonable.

Issues

Issue	Government's Argument	Colón's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by relying on an alleged 2019 cocaine seizure when sentencing.	PSR contained undisputed, sufficiently detailed allegations; Colón made admissions of drug use; reliance on unobjected-to PSR is allowed.	The alleged seizure was unsubstantiated in the record and Marrero‑Pérez bars weight being given to bare arrest allegations.	No plain error: unobjected-to PSR plus Colón’s admissions provided adequate indicia of reliability.
Whether the court’s statement that Colón was “dealing in cocaine” was erroneous (implying drug sales).	“Dealing” can mean using/being involved; context and record support that meaning.	“Dealing” means selling; no evidence of sales exists.	Ambiguous wording; no clear or obvious error on plain-error review and no contemporaneous objection to force clarification.
Whether Colón preserved substantive-reasonableness challenges and the applicable standard of review.	Specific objections were not raised below, so most claims are unpreserved and subject to plain-error review; Colón failed to argue plain‑error on appeal.	Argued that requesting a shorter sentence preserved substantive-reasonableness claims (Holguin‑Hernandez).	Only the general claim that the sentence was too long was preserved; specific challenges were unpreserved (and some waived).
Whether the 24‑month revocation sentence was substantively unreasonable.	Sentence fell within the properly calculated policy range; facts (repeated, escalating firearms possession while on supervision, large ammunition cache, prior supervision violations) justified top-of-range sentence.	The sentence was excessive given punishment in case 19‑771 and mitigating factors (nonviolent record, drug issues, depression).	No abuse of discretion: court gave a plausible, case‑specific rationale and the within-range 24‑month sentence was defensible.

Key Cases Cited

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedural/substantive reasonableness framework)
United States v. Marrero‑Pérez, 914 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2019) (arrest allegations without independent proof should not be equated with guilt at sentencing)
United States v. Millan‑Isaac, 749 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2014) (plain‑error standard for unpreserved sentencing objections)
Holguin‑Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762 (2020) (preservation when defendant requests a different sentence)
United States v. Ayala‑Lugo, 996 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2021) (specificity required to preserve sentencing objections)
United States v. Rivera‑Ruiz, 43 F.4th 172 (1st Cir. 2022) (sentencing findings must be supported by a preponderance and reliable information)
United States v. Tanco‑Pizarro, 892 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2018) (no bar to punishing both the substantive crime and supervised‑release violation)
United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588 (1st Cir. 2011) (within‑range sentence carries a presumption of reasonableness)