United States v. Collins, 461 F. App'x 807

Melvin Collins was convicted of sexually abusing his young daughter and sentenced to 66 months with supervised release.
He violated release conditions repeatedly, culminating in revocation and a new 41-month prison term.
Collins challenged the revocation sentence, arguing the court gave inadequate notice of the conditions, especially the sex offender treatment requirement.
The district court had initially imposed Standard Condition No. 18 requiring sex offender treatment, with subsequent judgments incorporating prior conditions by reference after each violation.
Collins argued due process required clearer notice and that incorporation by reference was insufficient to alert ordinary defendants.
The court assumed, for argument, that § 3582(a) applies to post-revocation sentencing and that rehabilitation considerations may have influenced the sentence, but concluded there was no plain error affecting the outcome.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Adequacy of notice for release conditions	Collins contends notice was insufficient despite incorporation by reference.	Collins argues conditions should be explicit in each order to satisfy notice.	Notice was adequate; incorporation by reference provided fair warning.
Rehabilitation as a sentencing factor in § 3583	Rehabilitation considerations may not justify imprisonment under Tapia and § 3583.	Court may consider rehabilitation goals in post-revocation sentencing.	Court may not rely on rehabilitation as a basis for imposing or extending imprisonment under § 3583.
Plain error standard applicability	Tapia invalidates prior Tsosie framework; error should be plain.	Plain error not satisfied or not affecting substantial rights.	Tapia makes the error plain; the court would apply plain error analysis to assess impact.
Effect of rehabilitation consideration on sentence	If rehabilitation had not been considered, Collins would likely have a shorter sentence.	Uncertain; the evidence shows factors like danger to the community also supported the sentence.	There is a reasonable probability the sentence would have differed if rehabilitation were not considered.

Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011) (rehabilitation cannot be a basis to lengthen imprisonment)
Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004) (distinguished imprisonment under § 3583 from location change; rehabilitation not considered)
Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2011) (plain-error framework for sentencing decisions)
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc; standards for plain error review)
Hasan, 526 F.3d 653 (10th Cir. 2008) (definition of materiality and impact on substantial rights in plain-error review)
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (fair warning when statutes refer to incorporated rights)
Hines v. Baker, 422 F.2d 1002 (10th Cir. 1970) (incorporation by reference can provide fair warning)
Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (Tapia's teachings apply to rehabilitation considerations in sentencing)
Grant, 664 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 2011) (analysis of Tapia's impact on sentencing practice)
Meacham, 567 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2009) (requirement to show strong possibility of a lower sentence in plain-error review)
Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (test for plain-error review and remedial discretion)