United States v. Collins
811 F.3d 63
1st Cir.2016Background
- Police responded to a reported drug-related fight; Collins was in the driver’s seat of Parsons’s car and Parsons was standing outside.
- Officer Morin ran the car’s plate, learned Parsons was on bail, and searched the vehicle based on her bail conditions.
- A gym bag in the back seat contained men’s clothing plus cocaine, sandwich bags, razor blades; neither Collins nor Parsons claimed ownership at the suppression hearing.
- Collins was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base; he pleaded guilty reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
- At sentencing the district court designated Collins a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on a prior drug trafficking conviction and a conviction for criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon; Collins received a below‑guidelines sentence of 200 months.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the search of the gym bag violated the Fourth Amendment | Govt: search of car was lawful; evidence admissible | Collins: search of bag exceeded scope because bag appeared to belong to a third party once male clothing was found | Court: Collins lacked standing/expectation of privacy in bag; suppression properly denied |
| Whether Collins qualifies as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because of prior "criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon" conviction | Govt: Maine offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the Force Clause | Collins: the Maine offense does not necessarily involve violent force (e.g., weapon like a box cutter may not be designed as a weapon) | Court: The statute’s elements require threatened use of an instrument capable of causing death/serious injury; it meets the Force Clause; career‑offender designation affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Belton v. United States, 520 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2008) (standard of review for factual findings at suppression)
- Sanchez v. United States, 943 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1991) (standing and legitimate expectation of privacy)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (Fourth Amendment rights are personal)
- Symonevich v. United States, 688 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2012) (testimony at suppression hearing not used as direct evidence at trial)
- Curet v. United States, 670 F.3d 296 (1st Cir. 2012) (de novo review of categorical force‑clause question)
- Ramos‑González v. United States, 775 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2015) (categorical approach for career‑offender predicate offenses)
- United States v. Martínez, 762 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2014) (elements, not facts, govern categorical inquiry)
- United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (categorical‑approach principle)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- United States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2015) (assault with dangerous weapon as violent felony analogy)