United States v. Coffman, 2:22-cr-00154

Defendant Tony Lee Coffman, a licensed wild American ginseng dealer in Birch River, WV, was indicted in the Southern District of Ohio on six counts under the Lacey Act for trafficking and falsely labeling wild American ginseng.
Allegations: Coffman bought ginseng knowing it was harvested in and unlawfully transported from Ohio, sold/purchased it, and submitted false dealer reports claiming the ginseng was dug in West Virginia.
American ginseng (Panax quinquefolius) is listed in CITES Appendix II and is protected by Ohio and West Virginia law; it is vulnerable to overharvesting.
Two pretrial motions: (1) dismiss for failure to state an offense because American ginseng purportedly falls within the Lacey Act’s "common food crop" exclusion; (2) dismiss for improper venue (and alternatively transfer to S.D. W.Va.).
Court reviewed statutory/regulatory definitions: Congress directed agencies to define "common food crop" (2008 amendments); USDA regulation (7 C.F.R. §357.2) defines the term and includes a threatened-species exception.
Ruling summary: Court denied both motions—held ginseng is a "plant" under the Lacey Act (regulatory definition entitled to Chevron deference) and venue in S.D. Ohio is proper; transfer denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether wild American ginseng is a "plant" under the Lacey Act (i.e., whether the "common food crop" exclusion applies)	Ginseng is listed in CITES and protected by state law, so it falls within the threatened-species exception to the common-food-crop exclusion; regulatory definition controls	Ginseng is a "common food crop" excluded from the Act; Congress omitted an exception for common food crops, so agencies cannot add one	The court gave Chevron deference to the USDA regulation; the regulatory threatened-species exception is consistent with statute and purpose, so wild ginseng is a "plant" under the Lacey Act; motion denied
Whether venue in the Southern District of Ohio is proper and whether transfer to S.D. W.Va. is warranted	Venue is proper under 18 U.S.C. §3237 as a continuing offense involving interstate transportation; indictment alleges harms and statutory violations tied to Ohio	Venue improper because no overt acts occurred in S.D. Ohio; alternatively, transfer to S.D. W.Va. is more convenient for defendant and witnesses	Indictment alleging offenses "within the Southern District of Ohio and elsewhere" suffices at this stage; §3237 and the substantial-contacts test support venue in S.D. Ohio; Platt factors do not favor transfer; motion denied

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishes deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations)
United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526 (6th Cir.) (indictment construed liberally; factual allegations accepted on pretrial motions)
United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir.) (describing Lacey Act’s federal role in enforcing state conservation laws)
United States v. McCullough, 891 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio) (earlier district-court decision treating American ginseng as a common food crop; discussed as superseded by statutory/regulatory changes)
United States v. Castaneda, [citation="315 F. App'x 564"] (6th Cir.) (applies the substantial-contacts test for venue)
United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213 (6th Cir.) (identifies factors for assessing venue constitutionality)