United States v. Clinton Waters
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9515
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Clinton Waters pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and faced sentencing as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
- The Presentence Report relied on two prior felony convictions to qualify Waters as a career offender: an Illinois enhanced domestic battery conviction (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-3.2) and a federal drug conspiracy conviction.
- Enhanced domestic battery in Illinois is a felony when committed after a prior domestic battery conviction; the underlying domestic battery statute requires causing bodily harm to a family or household member.
- Waters argued at sentencing and on appeal that the Illinois domestic battery statute does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, so it cannot qualify as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).
- The district court rejected Waters’s objection, treated the enhanced domestic battery as a felony crime of violence, and sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Illinois enhanced domestic battery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) | Waters: statute lacks an element requiring use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force | Government/Seventh Circuit: Illinois statute necessarily requires causing bodily harm, which entails physical force | Affirmed: conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1) |
| Whether the guidelines’ residual clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(2)) could save the classification | Waters: residual clause might be used but is unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson (2015) | Government: classification already satisfied under § 4B1.2(a)(1); residual clause irrelevant here | Not reached as dispositive: court relied on (a)(1) and did not apply residual clause |
| Whether Seventh Circuit precedent should be overturned in light of other circuits | Waters: cites conflicting decisions from Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth Circuits to argue for different interpretation | Seventh Circuit: existing controlling precedent holds domestic battery requires physical force; circuit split alone insufficient to overturn | Declined to overturn prior Seventh Circuit precedent |
| Whether Supreme Court decisions (Johnson, Castleman) alter the outcome | Waters: invoked Johnson decisions to challenge force element and residual clause | Government/Seventh Circuit: prior Seventh Circuit decisions distinguish Johnson; Castleman supports that poisoning/withholding medicine can be use of force | Court held prior Seventh Circuit treatment remains controlling and Castleman supports force finding |
Key Cases Cited
- De Leon Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762 (7th Cir.) (domestic battery under Illinois law requires physical force and is a crime of violence)
- LaGuerre v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir.) (felony domestic battery under Illinois law qualifies as a crime of violence)
- United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394 (7th Cir.) (Illinois domestic battery convictions qualify as violent felonies under ACCA)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interpreting "actual and intentional" contact battery; distinguished from Illinois standard)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (employing poison to cause physical harm constitutes use of force)
- United States v. Torres-Miguel, 701 F.3d 165 (4th Cir.) (interpreting similar state statutes and finding no force element)
- United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 625 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.) (distinguishing terroristic threats from violent-felony analysis)
- United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir.) (assault statute allowing reckless or negligent causation not a crime of violence)
- United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704 (8th Cir.) (adopts view that Illinois-style domestic battery can qualify as violent offense)
- Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463 (1st Cir.) (concludes similar statute does not necessarily include force element)