972 F.3d 946
8th Cir.2020Background
- Police searched a Colfax Avenue house and found drug-processing items (respirator masks, latex gloves, hydraulic presses, blender), a travel mug with ~300 g heroin, 839 g heroin, 751 g crack, and a 9mm handgun in a car trunk.
- A search of an Emerson Avenue apartment (connected to Reed by mail, tax docs, photos, casino cards, and a handwritten note claiming responsibility) recovered the same type of drug paraphernalia and two pistols (a Ruger .40 with a scratched serial, a Taurus .22 with a tip-up barrel).
- Forensic testing linked Reed’s DNA to a respirator mask from the Colfax house; Reed’s van contained the same brand of latex gloves; Reed’s phone contained drug-related texts and contemporaneous messages about police activity.
- Multiple cooperating witnesses testified Reed prepared/cut/pressed heroin, cooked powder to crack, placed drugs in the car, and possessed firearms; some cooperators sought sentence reductions.
- A jury convicted Reed of (1) conspiracy to distribute heroin/powder/crack, (2) possession with intent to distribute heroin and crack, and (3) possession of firearms as a felon; the district court sentenced him to 240 months (within a 235–293 Guideline range).
- Reed appealed challenging evidentiary sufficiency, racial composition of the jury venire (fair-cross-section), and the sentence (crack/powder Guidelines disparity).
Issues
| Issue | Reed's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for Counts 1 & 2 (conspiracy; possession with intent) | Cooperating witnesses were incentivized and unreliable; no one saw Reed at properties; evidence circumstantial | Multiple cooperating witnesses, DNA on mask, matching paraphernalia across sites, texts, physical drugs and presses support convictions | Evidence sufficient; jury could credit witnesses and infer Reed’s role in cooking/cutting and distribution |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Count 5 (felon-in-possession) | Government failed to prove Reed possessed the two guns found in the Emerson apartment | Guns were found in apartment linked to Reed; witnesses identified guns by distinctive features | Evidence sufficient to support felon-in-possession conviction |
| Jury venire fair‑cross‑section challenge (Rule 33 / Sixth Amendment) | Venire was overwhelmingly white and not representative of community | District uses multiple source lists (voter rolls, driver’s-license, state ID, tribal lists); Reed offered only state Black population percentage and no venire stats | Reed failed Duren step two—no statistical proof of under‑representation or systematic exclusion; motion denied |
| Sentencing challenge re: crack/powder conversion tables (Guidelines disparity) | Conversion tables treat crack far harsher; court should vary for policy reasons given disparate impact | Court has discretion to vary but is not required; district considered the argument and declined to vary | No procedural error; district did not abuse discretion in refusing a policy-based variance; 240‑month sentence was reasonable and within Guidelines |
Key Cases Cited
- Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (establishes three‑part fair‑cross‑section test for jury venires)
- Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (Sixth Amendment fair‑cross‑section requirement)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (standards for procedural and substantive review of sentencing)
- Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (district courts may categorically reject Guidelines on policy grounds)
- United States v. Meeks, 639 F.3d 522 (conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence; elements of conspiracy)
- United States v. Tillman, 765 F.3d 831 (jury may consider cooperating witnesses’ incentives when assessing credibility)
- United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873 (district court not required to vary from crack/powder Guidelines disparity)
- United States v. Clayton, 828 F.3d 654 (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for substantive reasonableness review)
- United States v. Parker, 871 F.3d 590 (sufficiency‑of‑evidence review standard)
- United States v. Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d 1017 (jury need not credit defendant’s denial; credibility is for the jury)