United States v. Clayton
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1383
7th Cir.2016Background
- Ambrose “Lamont” Clayton pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute ≥5 kg cocaine and ≥1 kg heroin and to money laundering; offenses were grouped under the drug guideline.
- Using the 2013 Guidelines, the district court calculated a base offense level of 32, adjusted to total offense level 33, criminal-history category I — guideline range 135–168 months.
- The court granted a substantial-assistance departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)/U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and imposed a 91-month sentence (well below the guideline range and statutory minimum).
- At sentencing the court and parties anticipated the Sentencing Commission’s proposed Amendment 782 (a two-level reduction) and the court indicated the 91-month sentence would remain appropriate even if the amendment took effect.
- Amendment 782 became retroactively effective, lowering Clayton’s total offense level to 31 and the guideline range to 108–135 months. Clayton moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a reduction to 72 months.
- The district court denied the § 3582(c)(2) motion, explaining that, despite eligibility, the court would not alter the original sentence given the offense severity and its original rationale. Clayton appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Clayton's Argument | District Court/Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court complied with Dillon step one (determine amended range and eligibility) | Court failed to state the new range and fully perform step one | Court and parties had anticipated the amendment; court acknowledged eligibility and reduction; omission harmless | No abuse of discretion; step one requirement satisfied/any omission harmless |
| Whether court complied with Dillon step two (consider § 3553(a) factors and exercise discretion) | Court did not consider all § 3553(a) factors, risk of early release, or Clayton’s prison conduct | District court relied on its original § 3553(a) analysis and sentencing rationale; need not reanalyze every factor absent new info | No abuse of discretion; explanation consistent with § 3553(a) and sufficient |
| Whether failure to present post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence (and counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness) required relief | Counsel was ineffective for not submitting post-sentencing evidence warranting reduction | No right to counsel in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings; thus no right to effective assistance | No relief; ineffective-assistance claim not cognizable in § 3582(c)(2) context |
| Whether remand required for district court to address post-sentencing events per Marion | District court did not discuss events since sentencing | Clayton submitted no evidence of significant post-sentencing events; Marion requires brief address only if relevant events exist | No remand; Marion satisfied because no significant events were presented |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (two-step framework for § 3582(c)(2) proceedings)
- United States v. Hill, 645 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2011) (harmless-error principles in § 3582 proceedings)
- United States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186 (7th Cir. 2012) (district court need only give explanation consistent with § 3553(a))
- United States v. Marion, 590 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2009) (district courts should briefly address significant events since original sentence)
- United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2009) (no right to counsel in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings)
- United States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 1999) (no constitutional right to counsel in § 3582 motions)
- Anderson v. Cowan, 227 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2000) (no right to effective counsel where no right to counsel exists)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (limitations on ineffective-assistance claims where counsel not constitutionally required)
- Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (no constitutional right to counsel in certain post-conviction proceedings)