United States v. City of New Orleans
731 F.3d 434
5th Cir.2013Background
- In July 2012 the DOJ sued the City of New Orleans alleging NOPD patterns or practices of unconstitutional conduct and, the same day, the City and DOJ submitted a proposed NOPD Consent Decree to the district court.
- The district court held a Fairness Hearing, posed extensive questions, and approved an amended Consent Decree on January 11, 2013, finding it fair, adequate, and reasonable.
- The City orally attempted to withdraw its consent before entry; after judgment it moved to vacate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The district court denied the 60(b) motion and the City appealed.
- The City raised several grounds for relief: asserted lack of informed consent because of related Orleans Parish Prison (OPP) cost exposure; alleged inability to fund both decrees; claimed FLSA and state-law problems from secondary-employment reforms in the NOPD decree; alleged DOJ misconduct (notably an AUSA’s anonymous online posts) and procedural errors at the Fairness Hearing.
- The district court found the City had been aware of OPP cost implications before agreeing, that the DOL had opined the secondary-employment rules remained within the FLSA exception, and that the City failed to meet Rule 60(b) standards for vacatur.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (City) | Defendant's Argument (DOJ) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the NOPD Consent Decree should be vacated under Rule 60(b) | City: Entry resulted from lack of informed consent and later-discovered problems warrant relief | DOJ: City consented, court vetted decree, no changed circumstances or fraud supporting vacatur | Court affirmed denial of 60(b); no abuse of discretion in refusing vacatur |
| Knowledge of OPP costs and funding burden | City: DOJ ambushed City; City did not know or could not foresee full OPP cost impact when it agreed | DOJ: City knew of OPP litigation, draft decrees, and budget estimates before signing | Court: Record shows City was aware of OPP cost implications prior to consent; City’s claim false |
| Financial impossibility to comply with both decrees | City: Compliance with both decrees would be substantially more onerous now | DOJ: City anticipated OPP costs; financial difficulty not a novel changed circumstance | Court: No modification; anticipated costs do not justify relief under Rufo standard |
| Secondary-employment provisions — FLSA and state law concerns | City: New oversight may trigger overtime obligations under FLSA and conflict with La. Rev. Stat. § 33:2339 | DOJ: DOL issued an opinion letter confirming the law-enforcement exception still applies; state statute enacted after 60(b) decision | Court: DOL letter defeats current FLSA claim; will not address post-judgment state statute issue now |
| Alleged DOJ misconduct and procedural defects at Fairness Hearing | City: AUSA Perricone’s anonymous posts and other misconduct tainted negotiations; hearing procedures (relaxed evidence rules, no cross-examination) eroded consent | DOJ: Misconduct did not prevent City from fully and fairly presenting its case; same relaxed procedures applied to both sides; City did not timely object | Court: City failed to show misconduct prevented fair presentation; evidence/procedure objections forfeited or non-prejudicial; no relief under Rule 60(b)(3) |
Key Cases Cited
- Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (consent-decree modification standard; changed circumstances required)
- White Farm Equip. Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526 (settlement agreements enforced; consent cannot be repudiated)
- Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256 (attempted pre-judgment revocation irrelevant to enforceability)
- Stovall v. City of Cocoa, 117 F.3d 1238 (court cannot refuse decree solely because a party later regrets it)
- League of United Latin Amer. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (en banc) (entry of consent decree is a judicial act; court must independently evaluate fairness)
- Ibarra v. Texas Employment Comm’n, 823 F.2d 873 (consent decree reversible where agreement was based on a mistake of law about governmental position)
- Gov’t Fin. Servs. One Ltd. P’ship v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767 (Rule 60(b)(3) requires misconduct that prevented fair presentation)
- Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (burden and standard to prove misconduct for Rule 60(b)(3))
- Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632 (clarifies Rule 60(b)(3) principles)
- Lowry Dev. v. Groves & Assocs. Ins., 690 F.3d 382 (appellate standard: abuse of discretion review for Rule 60(b) decisions)