United States v. Chevie Kehoe, 712 F.3d 1251

Kehoe was convicted of racketeering, conspiracy, and three murders in aid of racketeering; the government sought the death penalty but he received life without release.
Direct appeal affirmed; Kehoe later challenged his conviction via 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
At trial, defense sought to seat many African-American jurors by using thirty peremptory challenges on Caucasian venire members, after consulting a jury expert.
Jury composition ended with nine African-American and three Caucasian jurors, with three African-American and three Caucasian alternates.
Kehoe argued the strategy violated McCollum (racially discriminatory jury selection) and claimed prejudice; the district court denied relief.
On appeal, the court applied Strickland and Young, holding there was no presumptive prejudice and no demonstrated reasonable probability of different outcome.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether McCollum violation presumptively prejudices	Kehoe seeks presumption of prejudice under Young/ McCollum line.	Kehoe must show actual prejudice, not presumption.	Presumption rejected; prejudice required shown under Young.
Whether Young governs McCollum-type claims	Prejudice should be presumed per McCollum/ Batson framework.	Young controls, requiring actual prejudice showing.	Young applies; no presumptive prejudice found.
Whether counsel was effectively absent during voir dire	Cronic presumes prejudice when counsel is wholly absent during critical stage.	Counsel participated, not wholly absent; no Cronic presumption.	No total deprivation; Cronic presumption not triggered.
Whether Kehoe suffered Strickland prejudice	Prejudice exists because counsel’s strategy left Kehoe effectively without counsel during voir dire.	No demonstrated reasonable probability of different outcome without counsel's strategy.	No shown prejudice; Strickland failure.
Whether Ford/McGurk carve-outs override Young on this issue	Structural error presumptively prejudicial under Ford/McGurk.	Young forecloses presumptive prejudice; structural-error analysis not controlling here.	Young forecloses presumptive prejudice; no structural-error analysis applied.

McCollum v. Georgia, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (prohibits racial exclusion via peremptory challenges)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (equal protection limits on peremptory challenges)
Young v. Bowersox, 161 F.3d 1159 (8th Cir. 1998) (Batson-related claims not presumptively prejudicial; require prejudice show)
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (presumption of prejudice when counsel denied at critical stage)
White v. Luebbers, 307 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2002) (voir dire not automatically prejudicial; counsel not wholly absent)
Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995) (pre-Batson; discriminatory jury selection treated as structural defect)
McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 1998) (right-to-jury-trial information as structural error; prejudice considerations)
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (structural-errors analogy in jury-selection context)
Raymond v. Weber, 552 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2009) (prejudice standards under Cronic and Strickland)