United States v. Chelsey Mayweather, 991 F.3d 1163

Background

FBI ran an 18‑month undercover sting (agent Aakeem Woodard) targeting corrections‑officer corruption; Woodard recruited officers to ride in marked uniforms during fake drug transports.
Four officers — Jeremy Fluellen, Christopher Williams, Tramaine Tucker, and Chelsey Mayweather — were indicted on multiple counts including attempted distribution of controlled substances and Hobbs Act extortion (under color of official right).
At trial the district court initially allowed entrapment to be raised but later refused defendants’ requests for entrapment jury instructions and told jurors after a note that "entrapment is not a defense in this case." The court also declined to give the post‑McDonnell pattern instruction and gave a pre‑McDonnell Hobbs Act charge that did not define "official act."
The jury convicted all four on all counts. Defendants appealed arguing (1) denial of entrapment instructions and (2) failure to define "official act" for Hobbs Act extortion counts.
The Eleventh Circuit held Fluellen and Williams met the light burden to present entrapment (so omission of instructions was reversible for them), held Tucker and Mayweather did not meet that burden (their drug convictions affirmed), and held the failure to define "official act" was reversible error for all four Hobbs Act convictions; cases remanded accordingly.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendants were entitled to entrapment jury instructions	Government: no derivative entrapment; recruitment by co‑defendants means no government inducement; evidence insufficient to show inducement	Defendants: Woodard’s repeated promises, payments, pressure, and appeals to non‑criminal motives raised a jury question of inducement	Fluellen and Williams met the light production burden and should have received instructions; Tucker and Mayweather did not. Reversal for Fluellen and Williams on counts affected.
Whether district court erred by refusing the post‑McDonnell pattern "official act" instruction	Government: pattern language (references to lawsuits/hearings) could mislead jurors in a corrections‑officer context; pattern does not fit facts	Defendants: McDonnell requires limiting definition of "official act"; pattern instruction properly implements McDonnell guidance	Court did not abuse discretion in refusing the post‑McDonnell pattern instruction as written because parts could mislead given the factual setting.
Whether failure to define "official act" in any instruction was error	Government: indictment and charge references sufficed; no prejudice	Defendants: McDonnell’s constitutional and vagueness concerns require clear jury guidance on "official act"; absence deprived defendants of fair trial	Failure to define "official act" was reversible error for all Hobbs Act counts; convictions vacated and remanded for retrial on those counts.

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (limits and defines what qualifies as an "official act" for quid pro quo/bribery/extortion contexts)
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) (entrapment consists of government inducement plus lack of predisposition)
United States v. Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2019) (jury instruction standards and need for proper "official act" guidance in law enforcement bribery contexts)
United States v. Isnadin, 742 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) (derivative entrapment doctrine and limits when government had no contact with the defendant)
United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618 (11th Cir. 1995) (entrapment requires inducement beyond mere opportunity; production burden is light)
United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1982) (failure to give entrapment instruction when threshold evidence exists is reversible error)