United States v. Chawan Lowe, 2 F.4th 652

May 22, 2019: police responded to reports of shots fired near a South Sangamon Street residence; shortly after, officers encountered Chawan Lowe running nearby; he said he was looking for his dog.
Security footage showed a person wearing Lowe’s clothes, backpack, and tattoo running from the residence and throwing a gun-shaped object into a nearby dumpster.
Officers recovered a 9mm Ruger from the dumpster; ballistics tied that gun to the shots fired, but no fingerprints, DNA, or GSR conclusively linked Lowe to the gun.
Lowe was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); the district court admitted testimony that officers were responding to shots fired at the scene and instructed the jury that such testimony could be used only to assess knowledge/operability.
Jury returned guilty; during polling Juror 11 answered, “Yes. Barely.” The judge asked, “You said yes?” Juror 11 replied, “Yes, ma’am.” Lowe moved for a mistrial and further juror questioning; the court denied the motions and sentenced Lowe to 90 months.
Lowe appealed, arguing (1) the “shots fired” testimony was inadmissible other-act evidence under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 and (2) the juror’s “barely” comment revealed lack of unanimity and the court’s follow-up was coercive under Rule 31(d).

Issue	Lowe's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Admissibility of testimony that shots were fired shortly before recovery of the gun (Rule 404(b) / Rule 403)	Testimony was impermissible other-act evidence used to “complete the story” and to invite propensity inferences; should be excluded under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403.	The testimony was relevant to possession—showed the gun was recently fired and disposed of nearby, corroborated the video, and thus tended to prove Lowe possessed the gun; a limiting instruction mitigated prejudice.	Admission was not an abuse of discretion: evidence was probative of possession (not merely propensity/“complete the story”), Rule 403 balance favored admission, and the limiting instruction reduced prejudice.
Juror polling and alleged lack of unanimity (Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d))	Juror 11’s “Yes. Barely.” showed equivocation and lack of unanimous individual verdict; the judge’s follow-up was coercive; mistrial or further inquiry was required.	The initial answer was an affirmative albeit indicating a narrow decision; the judge’s brief clarification elicited an unequivocal “Yes, ma’am”; no coercion or lack of unanimity.	No abuse of discretion: Juror 11’s answer did not reveal lack of unanimity and the court’s follow-up produced a clear affirmative; denial of mistrial was proper.

United States v. Canady, 578 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2009) (other-act evidence of a prior shooting can be admissible to prove later possession of the firearm)
United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (other-act evidence admissible when supported by a propensity-free chain of reasoning)
United States v. Nelson, 958 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2020) (warning against admitting evidence solely to “complete the story”)
United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing permissible non-propensity uses of other-act evidence)
United States v. Adams, 628 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing when evidence constitutes direct evidence of the charged offense)
United States v. Banks, 982 F.3d 1098 (7th Cir. 2020) (examples of juror polling that revealed lack of unanimity and coercive post-poll handling)
United States v. Williams, 819 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding coercion when court’s post-poll procedures pressured jurors to conform)
United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (juror polling: “Yes, with a question mark” as revealing uncertainty)
Edwards v. United States, 469 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1972) (juror statements revealing lingering doubt can show lack of unanimity)