651 F. App'x 920
11th Cir.2016Background
- Jenkins pled guilty to attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) for handing a teller a robbery note and leaving without taking property.
- PSI treated Jenkins as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two prior Florida robbery convictions (1999 robbery under Fla. Stat. § 812.13 and a 2002 strong-arm robbery), raising his offense level and criminal-history category.
- Jenkins objected, arguing his 1999 Florida robbery did not categorically qualify as a "crime of violence" because pre-1999 Florida law allegedly allowed mere "sudden snatching" to be prosecuted as robbery. He also challenged the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) as vague.
- The PSI Addendum identified the 1999 conviction specifically as § 812.13(2)(c) (strong-arm robbery without a weapon); no Shepard documents were submitted by the government, and the parties did not dispute the Addendum’s factual statement.
- The district court overruled Jenkins’s objections, concluded both the § 2113(a) offense and the 1999 Florida robbery qualify as "crimes of violence" under the enumerated-offenses and elements clauses of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), granted a downward departure for mental illness under § 5H1.3, and imposed a 60-month sentence.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a) is an enumerated crime of violence and satisfies the elements clause, and (2) Jenkins’s 1999 § 812.13(1)/(2)(c) conviction categorically qualifies as a crime of violence (Robinson foreclosed the "sudden snatching" argument).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2113(a) attempted bank robbery is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) | Jenkins: § 2113(a) committed "by intimidation" might not involve threatened/violent physical force, so it may not meet elements clause or enumerated robbery definition | Government: § 2113(a) (including intimidation) is equivalent to generic robbery and thus an enumerated crime and meets the elements clause | Held: § 2113(a) (even by intimidation) is an enumerated crime of violence and satisfies the elements clause |
| Whether Jenkins’s 1999 Florida robbery conviction under Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1)/(2)(c) is a "crime of violence" | Jenkins: Pre-1999 practice allegedly allowed "sudden snatching" prosecutions under § 812.13, which would fall outside generic robbery and elements clause | Government/PSI: § 812.13(1) requires force/putting in fear and therefore categorically matches generic robbery; PSI addendum specified § 812.13(2)(c) (no weapon) | Held: Robinson and Florida precedent show § 812.13(1) never encompassed mere snatching; the 1999 conviction categorically qualifies under enumerated and elements clauses |
| Whether the § 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause’s vagueness problem required resolution here | Jenkins: Residual clause is unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson; thus career-offender designation might fail if dependent on residual clause | Government: Both convictions qualify under enumerated/elements clauses, so residual clause need not be reached | Held: Court did not reach vagueness question because both offenses qualified under enumerated and elements clauses |
| Whether the district court properly designated Jenkins a career offender and calculated Guidelines | Jenkins: Career-offender designation improper if prior conviction is not a crime of violence | Government/PSI: Two prior qualifying robbery felonies exist; § 2113(a) is a qualifying instant offense | Held: Career-offender designation and resulting Guidelines calculations were correct; sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (Florida robbery § 812.13(1) categorically matches generic robbery and satisfies elements clause)
- United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting vagueness challenge to § 4B1.2(a)(2) in Eleventh Circuit)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (elements clause requires violent force; guidance on "physical force")
- United States v. Welch, 683 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (discussed pre‑Robinson Florida snatching issue in ACCA context)
- United States v. Kelley, 412 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2005) (defining intimidation for § 2113(a) as when an ordinary person reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm)
- Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1997) (Florida Supreme Court: mere snatching without overcoming resistance is theft, not robbery)