45 F.4th 192
D.C. Cir.2022Background
- In May 2016, 55-year‑old Charles Morgan picked up 15‑year‑old J.T. in Washington, D.C.; he drove into Maryland, where he sexually assaulted her; she later reported the incident and identified Morgan.
- Police, posing as J.T., exchanged messages with Morgan; a recorded call included Morgan’s request for sexual images and a statement from J.T. that she was 14.
- Morgan was indicted on counts including transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity (18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)), attempted production of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251), and SORNA‑related offenses; the trial was bifurcated (jury then bench on SORNA counts).
- The government introduced FBI Special Agent Kevin Horan as an expert on drive tests and cell‑tower coverage (using Gladiator equipment and ESPA software) to place Morgan’s and J.T.’s phones geographically that night; the district court held a multi‑day Daubert hearing and admitted the testimony with limits.
- The jury convicted Morgan on the transportation and attempted production counts; a stipulated bench trial convicted him on the SORNA counts; Morgan was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of drive‑test expert evidence (Rule 702 reliability) | Government: Horan is qualified; drive testing is an accepted industry and law‑enforcement method and helps locate phones. | Morgan: Drive test was too limited in scope; ESPA is proprietary and not peer‑reviewed; methodology unreliable here. | Court: No abuse of discretion—Horan qualified; methodology sufficiently reliable; execution concerns go to weight, not admissibility. |
| Expert testimony misleading/juror confusion (Rule 403) | Government: Maps are probative to corroborate interstate transport. | Morgan: Maps may imply precise locations and mislead jury. | Court: Probative value outweighed risk only if expert overstated precision; court limited testimony and Horan complied; admission not an abuse of discretion. |
| §2423(a) "knowingly" clause — must defendant know victim was under 18? | Morgan: "Knowingly" should apply to victim's age; government must prove defendant knew victim was under 18. | Government: "Knowingly" modifies transport conduct but not the victim's age; protecting minors justifies strictness. | Held: "Knowingly" need not extend to knowledge of under‑18 status; conviction valid without proof Morgan knew J.T. was under 18. |
| §2423(a) intent clause — must defendant know victim was under age of consent (here, 16)? | Morgan: To intend criminal sexual activity (statutory rape) defendant must know victim was under the state age of consent. | Government: The intent element requires intent that sexual activity occur; whether that activity is chargeable is determined by the applicable state statute (piggyback); knowledge of age not required. | Held: No requirement that defendant know victim was under 16; intent clause satisfied if defendant intended sexual activity that, by state law, would be chargeable (even if strict liability as to age). |
| SORNA delegation challenge | Morgan: SORNA delegating rulemaking to AG is an unconstitutional delegation. | Government: Gundy forecloses this claim. | Held: Challenge rejected as foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent in Gundy. |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (framework for assessing admissibility and reliability of expert testimony under Rule 702)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (trial judge has broad latitude in determining reliability of expert testimony)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (presumption favoring scienter and analysis of when mens rea applies to statutory elements)
- Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (ordinary grammatical scope of adverbs like "knowingly" in criminal statutes)
- X‑Citement Video, Inc. v. United States, 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (sex‑offense context can justify departures from mens rea presumptions regarding victim age)
- United States v. Chin, 981 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (no knowledge‑of‑age requirement for statutes protecting juveniles; legislative purpose to protect minors)
- United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (certain juvenile‑status elements need not carry mens rea; discussion of mens rea exceptions)
- United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2016) (historical cell‑site analysis and its admissibility/reliability in evidence)