United States v. Charles Gatson, 776 F.3d 405

On June 5, 2014, East Cleveland dispatch relayed a school-bus driver’s report (named, identifiable informant) that a black male in a black/ dark GMC SUV was approaching young girls on Euclid Avenue near the bus depot.
Officers located a dark GMC SUV in a Walgreens parking lot about a block from the reported location; a man matching the description (Gatson) sat inside.
Officers approached, asked questions; Gatson admitted drinking and talking to young girls and was seen pushing something between the driver’s seat and center console.
Officers removed, handcuffed, and frisked Gatson; one officer observed a pistol handle protruding from the seat gap, retrieved the gun, and Gatson was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (9).
Gatson moved to suppress the pistol; the district court credited officers’ testimony, denied suppression, and Gatson pled guilty while reserving the suppression appeal.
At sentencing the court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) based on prior arson and two domestic-violence felonies, imposing the 15-year mandatory minimum and sentencing Gatson to 180 months; Gatson appealed suppression and career-offender designation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gatson)	Defendant's Argument (Gov't)	Held
Legality of initial investigative stop	Dispatcher tip was effectively anonymous; insufficient reasonable suspicion	Tip was from an identifiable school-bus driver whose description matched Gatson and location	Stop was supported by reasonable suspicion; affirmed
Removal from vehicle, handcuff, and vehicle search	Officers exceeded Terry bounds; removal and search unjustified	Officers reasonably suspected Gatson was armed and dangerous (slurred speech, pushing object)	Removal, frisk, and protective search were lawful
Credibility of officers vs. Gatson at suppression hearing	Court should have credited Gatson’s testimony; officers’ statements contained omissions/ inconsistencies	District court reasonably credited officers; omissions were immaterial or explained	Credibility findings not clearly erroneous; trial court credited officers
Career-offender classification under § 924(e)	Domestic-violence convictions are not "violent felonies" in § 924(e); Castleman dicta supports narrower reading	Arson is a listed violent felony; Ohio domestic-violence felonies involve "physical harm" and thus are violent felonies	Arson and the Ohio domestic-violence convictions qualify as violent felonies; § 924(e) application affirmed

Campbell v. United States, 549 F.3d 364 (6th Cir.) (standard for reviewing investigatory stops)
Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.) (tips/dispatcher information can supply reasonable suspicion)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (permitting brief investigatory stops on reasonable suspicion)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (U.S. 2009) (officer safety measures during traffic stops; frisk and protective search rules)
United States v. Graham, 483 F.3d 431 (6th Cir.) (scope of protective searches related to officer safety)
United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530 (6th Cir.) (deference to district court credibility findings)
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1985) (standard for overturning credibility findings)
United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir.) (reviewing whether prior convictions are violent felonies under § 924(e))
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (U.S. 2013) (categorical approach and use of charging documents when statutes are divisible)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (generic-offense approach for listed felonies like arson)
United States v. Misleveck, 735 F.3d 983 (7th Cir.) (discussion that arson of property fits generic arson)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2010) (definition of "physical force" as violent force for § 924(e))
United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (U.S. 2014) (interpreting "physical force" in § 922(g)(9); context-sensitive meaning)