919 F.3d 385
6th Cir.2019Background
- Charles Eason pleaded guilty in 2017 to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
- The Presentence Report recommended ACCA enhancement based on five Tennessee felony convictions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433(a) (promotion of methamphetamine manufacture).
- The district court rejected the ACCA enhancement, reasoning that convictions based on purchase of an ingredient with reckless disregard of its intended use did not "involve" manufacturing for ACCA purposes, and sentenced Eason to 46 months.
- The government appealed, arguing the Tennessee statute targets gathering of ingredients and thus "involves" manufacturing under the ACCA’s definition of a "serious drug offense."
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Eason’s prior convictions qualify as ACCA predicates under the categorical/modified categorical approach and whether Tennessee’s recklessness mens rea still "involves" manufacture.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Eason) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee convictions under §39‑17‑433(a)(1) qualify as ACCA "serious drug offenses" because they "involve" manufacturing | Eason: convictions could rest on purchasing an ingredient with only reckless disregard of its intended use, which is too attenuated from manufacturing to "involve" it | U.S.: statute targets gathering ingredients used to make methamphetamine; even reckless purchases are related/connected to manufacture and thus qualify | Held: Yes. Convictions can rest on the least-offending means (reckless purchase), but such conduct still "involves" manufacture for ACCA purposes |
| Whether the Tennessee statute is divisible and whether the record permits use of the modified categorical approach | Eason: some statutory alternatives are means not elements; district court used categorical approach to treat recklessness as possible basis | U.S.: statute is divisible as to alternative subsections and indictments show (a)(1) counts; mens rea alternatives are not separate elements | Held: The statute is divisible as to subsection (a)(1); indictment shows element of "purchase of an ingredient," but mens rea alternatives (knowledge vs. recklessness) are means, so the categorical approach presumes the least culpable means |
| Whether ACCA requires a specific mens rea (intent) for underlying state offenses to count as "involving" manufacturing | Eason: legislative history and policy suggest ACCA targets intentional participants in drug production/distribution; recklessness should not qualify | U.S.: ACCA’s text contains no mens rea requirement for "involving" manufacturing; Congress omitted such a requirement intentionally | Held: ACCA does not require a specific intent mens rea for the underlying state offense; the degree of culpability is relevant but lack of intent does not preclude a predicate offense |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes categorical approach to predicate offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (limits use of modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (documents permissible when applying modified categorical approach)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (presume conviction rested on least of acts criminalized when applying categorical approach)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (distinguishes elements from means; divisibility analysis)
- United States v. Stafford, 721 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. standard of de novo review for ACCA interpretation)
- United States v. Goldston, 906 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. authority on definition of serious drug offense under ACCA)
- Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (rule of lenity applies only if ambiguity remains after exhaustive interpretation)
- Bass v. United States, 404 U.S. 336 (rule of lenity resolves statutory ambiguity in favor of defendant)