United States v. Charles Chapple, Jr.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1667
5th Cir.2017Background
- Chapple was convicted in 2005 in the Southern District of Texas for cocaine conspiracy and sentenced to 87 months, to run consecutively to an undischarged California term.
- While serving the Texas sentence he escaped in California and later was convicted in New Jersey, receiving consecutive 48-month and 15-month sentences to follow the Texas term.
- Amendment 782 (retroactive Nov. 1, 2015) lowered base offense levels for many drug offenses by two levels, creating potential § 3582(c)(2) reductions for eligible prior sentences.
- Chapple moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in March 2015 seeking a retroactive reduction of his Texas sentence; the district court denied relief because Chapple had already completed that 87‑month term.
- Chapple appealed pro se, invoking Garlotte v. Fordice and arguing that consecutively served sentences should be aggregated (a “continuous stream”) to permit a § 3582(c)(2) reduction of the earlier, already‑served term.
- The Government waived an appellate timeliness defect; the Fifth Circuit considered whether § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C) bars reducing a sentence below time already served and affirmed the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court may reduce, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and retroactive Amendment 782, a previously imposed sentence that the defendant has already served while the defendant is serving later consecutive sentences | Chapple: Garlotte‘s “in custody” principle and § 3584(c) support treating consecutive sentences as a continuous aggregate so a retroactive reduction of the earlier served term can advance release | Government: § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C) and its commentary prohibit reducing a term below time already served; § 3584(c) governs administrative aggregation only and does not override § 1B1.10 | Held: Denial affirmed — § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C) forbids reducing a sentence below time served, so Chapple is ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief for the already‑served sentence. |
| Whether Garlotte v. Fordice allows habeas-style "in custody" aggregation to circumvent § 1B1.10 limitations in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings | Chapple: Garlotte’s liberal "in custody" concept supports aggregation for retroactive reduction | Government: Garlotte is limited to habeas context and does not displace Guidelines policy barring reduction below time served | Held: Garlotte’s habeas context is not controlling; courts have rejected its extension to § 3582(c)(2) reductions (affirming line of other circuits). |
| Whether separate timing of sentence imposition (simultaneous vs. separately imposed consecutive sentences) matters to eligibility for § 3582(c)(2) reduction | Chapple: (argues aggregation should apply regardless) | Government: Timing not dispositive; § 1B1.10 controls | Held: Court declined to decide the simultaneously‑imposed distinction as unnecessary here; noted Vaughn and declined to reach that question. |
| Whether denial violated due process | Chapple: For the first time on appeal claimed a due process violation | Government: Sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is discretionary and no due process error occurred | Held: Due process claim reviewed for plain error and fails; no error because reduction is discretionary and district court correctly applied § 1B1.10. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Martinez, 496 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (timeliness of criminal appeals is non‑jurisdictional and may be waived)
- United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2009) (standards of review for § 3582(c)(2) motions and Guidelines interpretation)
- United States v. Henderson, 636 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2011) (abuse‑of‑discretion and error standards in sentencing matters)
- Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995) (habeas “in custody” concept for attacking earlier consecutive sentence)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (two‑step framework for § 3582(c)(2): consistency with § 1B1.10 then consideration of § 3553(a) factors)
- United States v. Vaughn, 806 F.3d 640 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming denial of § 3582(c)(2) relief for an already‑served consecutive sentence; distinguishing habeas context)