United States v. Charles Barefoot, Jr., 754 F.3d 226

Background

Barefoot pleaded guilty in 2003 to possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic-violence restraining order under a written Plea Agreement in which the government promised not to prosecute conduct underlying that indictment and agreed not to use information he provided in the debriefing to prosecute additional crimes, "except for crimes of violence."
During the debriefing Barefoot admitted to involvement in various Klan activities, receipt of two Kinestik binary explosive cartridges (in exchange for a dog), and described interactions with co-conspirators who later murdered Lawrence Petit.
In 2006 a federal Superseding Indictment charged Barefoot with (inter alia) conspiracy and receiving stolen firearms (Counts 1–2), solicitation to destroy buildings by explosives (Count 3), receiving an explosive with intent to use it for violence or property destruction (Count 4), improper storage of explosives (Count 5, misdemeanor), and distribution of explosives to a minor (Count 6).
At trial the government introduced 404(b) evidence (including Petit-murder-related evidence) to prove intent and corroborate witnesses; the jury convicted Barefoot on all six counts.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed convictions on Counts 1–4, reversed Counts 5 and 6 as violative of the Plea Agreement’s immunity scope, and remanded with instructions to amend the judgment; it held resentencing unnecessary because the vacated convictions did not affect the imposed 180-month sentence.

Issues

Issue	Barefoot's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
1. Denial of Faretta (self-representation) motion	Barefoot argued he was competent to represent himself.	District court: Barefoot remained insufficiently competent to conduct his own defense given partial remission of delusional disorder and courtroom observations.	Denial affirmed — court properly exercised discretion under Indiana v. Edwards after observing defendant and considering forensic evaluation.
2. Admissibility of Petit/murder evidence under Rule 404(b)	Petit evidence was overly prejudicial and collateral; should be excluded.	Evidence was admissible to show intent, plan, and corroborate that Barefoot’s solicitations were sincere.	Admission affirmed — 404(b) factors satisfied; limiting instructions mitigated prejudice.
3. Sufficiency of evidence on Count 3 (solicitation to bomb courthouse)	Gautier’s testimony showed only vague talk, not a solicitation; therefore insufficient.	Even an "endeavor to persuade" suffices; circumstantial evidence (boat, plan, explosives) supported sincerity and intent.	Conviction affirmed — evidence sufficient for solicitation elements including sincerity.
4. Sufficiency of evidence on Count 4 (receiving explosive with intent)	No direct testimony of Barefoot’s intent to use explosives for violence; thus insufficient.	Circumstantial evidence (timing of acquisition, prior threats, bomb-making, and solicitation to bomb courthouse) supports inference of intent.	Conviction affirmed — reasonable inferences permitted; evidence sufficient.
5. Plea-Agreement immunity scope and Counts 5–6 prosecution	Plea Agreement barred use (direct and derivative) of debriefing information to prosecute non-violent offenses; prosecutions on Counts 5 & 6 violated that immunity.	Government read agreement to bar only direct evidentiary use and to permit prosecution of violent offenses; Counts 4–6 not barred.	Court interpreted 4.f to confer use immunity including derivative use (except for crimes of violence). Count 4 (a crime of violence) was not barred; Counts 5 (misdemeanor) and 6 (ambiguous whether crime of violence) were barred — convictions reversed.
6. Sentencing grouping / Guidelines calculation	Grouping and base-level enhancements improperly tied firearms and explosives conduct, overstating Guidelines range.	Offenses were part of same course of conduct; explosives conduct relevant to firearms guideline calculations and grouping.	Sentencing calculations affirmed — court did not clearly err grouping conduct; vacating Counts 5–6 did not affect the 180-month aggregate sentence, so no resentencing required.

Key Cases Cited

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (different competency standards for represented vs. pro se defendants)
United States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2014) (standards and balancing for Rule 404(b) evidence)
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (use and derivative-use immunity principles)
In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973) (use-immunity blocks direct and derivative use)
United States v. Garcia, 956 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1992) (parol evidence and equitable considerations in enforcing plea agreements)
United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2006) (scope of immunity in plea agreements governed by contract language)