United States v. Charles Bacon, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3116

Defendant Charles T. Bacon pled guilty (no written plea agreement) to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Incident: April 2, 2014 — Bacon, agitated, entered a woman’s home holding a shotgun; officers found him running out unarmed; a subsequent search uncovered several firearms and ammunition.
At sentencing the district court applied: +2 for 3–7 firearms (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)); -2 and -1 for acceptance/assistance (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1), yielding offense level 13 and criminal history IV (Guidelines range 24–30 months).
The government conceded two other proposed enhancements (possession in connection with another felony and stolen firearm) were unsupported; they were not applied.
The district court varied upward after considering 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors (criminal history, need for respect for law, public protection) and imposed 60 months imprisonment and three years supervised release.
Bacon appealed, arguing the upward variance (double the Guidelines high end) was substantively unreasonable because it relied on factors already accounted for in the Guidelines.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the upward variance to 60 months was substantively unreasonable	Bacon: the variance is unwarranted and duplicates Guidelines factors (criminal history, deterrence, punishment)	Government/District Court: § 3553(a) factors justified an upward variance to protect public and promote respect for law	Affirmed — court did not abuse discretion; district court reasonably weighed § 3553(a) factors and Gall requires deference to its judgment
Whether reliance on criminal history and deterrence alone can justify a large upward variance	Bacon: those factors were already reflected in the Guidelines, so they cannot justify doubling the sentence	Court: consideration of those factors is permissible; no rigid rule forbidding variance for reasons overlapping Guidelines	Rejected Bacon’s contention; overlap does not automatically render variance unreasonable
Whether an extraordinary showing is required to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines	Bacon: implied need for strong justification due to magnitude of variance	Precedent (Gall/Feemster): no requirement of "extraordinary" circumstances or mathematical formula	Court applied Gall/Feemster and found no such heightened showing required
Standard of review for substantive reasonableness	Bacon: challenges substantive reasonableness of sentence	Appellate Court: apply deferential abuse-of-discretion review per Gall	Applied deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and affirmed

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (courts must give due deference to district courts’ § 3553(a) sentencing determinations)
United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474 (8th Cir. 2007) (vacated variance nearly double Guidelines where district relied primarily on factors already in Guidelines)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (no requirement of "extraordinary" circumstances to justify deviation; no rigid percentage-based rule)
United States v. Cole, 721 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2013) (clarifies deference due to district court after Gall)