United States v. Charles Armour
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18663
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- In 2008 Armour pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon; sentenced to 51 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release.
- While on supervised release (started Oct 23, 2012) Armour committed multiple violations: trespass/run from police (Missouri arrest), four positive marijuana tests, and in April 2014 was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery for beating his 8‑year‑old son (seven‑year state sentence).
- Probation filed a revocation petition and a violation memorandum (which attached the original 2008 PSR and summarized Armour’s supervision history); Armour conceded violation and waived contesting the alleged facts at the revocation hearing.
- The district court revoked supervised release and sentenced Armour to 24 months imprisonment and 1 year supervised release; the court orally imposed multiple discretionary conditions of supervised release which Armour then objected to and appealed.
- On appeal Armour challenged (1) the use and adoption of the violation memorandum facts, (2) the sentencing factors relied on by the district court, (3) the length of supervised release, and (4) several specific supervised‑release conditions (e.g., drug‑places ban, reporting requirements, weapon ban, association restrictions, home visits).
Issues
| Issue | Armour's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use of violation memorandum / adoption of its facts | District court improperly relied on facts in violation memorandum that were not in the revocation petition and whose reliability was not determined | Armour reviewed the memo, waived contesting those facts, and many facts were supported by plea/lab tests/statements | Waiver: Armour knowingly waived challenges; even if forfeited, facts were reliable and admissible; no plain error |
| Sentencing factors relied upon | Court improperly relied on §3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness/just punishment) not listed in §3583(e) | §3553(a)(2)(A) may be considered if court relies primarily on §3583(e) factors; overlap exists | No abuse or plain error: court primarily relied on nature/circumstances and history (proper §3583(e) factors), §3553(a)(2)(A) was permissible secondary consideration |
| Length of supervised release (1 year) | Court provided no separate justification for supervised‑release length | Supervised release is part of the overall sentence; court’s justification for imprisonment applies to supervised release | De novo review: adequate justification exists because court considered §3553 factors relevant to revocation/supervision |
| Validity of several discretionary conditions (drug‑places ban; reporting; weapon ban; residence/employment notification; no contact with known felons; home visits; notify on arrest; drug treatment) | Conditions vague, overbroad, violate rights (Fourth/Fifth), delegate too much discretion to probation | Conditions are reasonably related to rehabilitation/public protection, include knowledge requirements, and fall within statutory/precedent bounds | Abuse of discretion review: conditions upheld as sufficiently specific, related to §3553 purposes, and not unconstitutionally vague or overly delegatory |
Key Cases Cited
- Brodie v. United States, 507 F.3d 527 (7th Cir.) (defendant can waive objections to sentencing materials by strategic choice)
- United States v. Jaimes‑Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845 (7th Cir.) (waiver requires knowing, intentional relinquishment)
- United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir.) (consideration of §3553(a)(2)(A) in revocation sentencing permissible if §3583(e) factors remain primary)
- United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir.) (standards for review of supervised‑release conditions; vagueness and notice principles)
- United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871 (7th Cir.) (three‑part test for reasonable supervised‑release conditions under §3583(d))
- United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793 (7th Cir.) (supervised‑release conditions can implicate but reasonably limit constitutional rights)
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (U.S. Supreme Court) (describing supervised release as transitional "decompression stage")
- United States v. Watts, 798 F.3d 650 (7th Cir.) (interpretation of “dangerous weapon” in sentencing contexts)