United States v. Charles A. Evans
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11161
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Charles Evans pleaded guilty to distributing heroin; sentence below guidelines to 144 months; he appealed sentencing adjustments.
- From May–Sept 2014 Evans sold heroin frequently, often at coconspirator Tiana Williams’s apartment; multiple controlled buys and regular customer testimony established substantial sales (100–400 g acknowledged).
- Evidence at the apartment: empty packaging, a scale, hidden storage locations, and admissions that Williams was present for many sales; customers testified purchases often occurred at that address.
- While detained on a probation hold, Evans used monitored jail calls to instruct Williams to pressure a customer (J.J.) to recant a report; Williams visited J.J.’s home and later lied to investigators about it.
- District court applied two-level upward adjustments under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) (maintaining a premises) and § 3C1.1 (obstruction), and denied a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1; total offense level produced range 168–210 months, court sentenced to 144 months.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of § 2D1.1(b)(12) (maintaining a premises) | Evans: No possessory interest; did not rent, live in, or control the apartment; merely sold there occasionally | Government: Evans controlled activities and access; directed customers there and stored drugs there (constructive possession) | Court: Affirmed—Evans exercised control and used the apartment repeatedly to store and sell drugs; § 2D1.1(b)(12) applies |
| Acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under § 3E1.1 despite obstruction | Evans: He pleaded guilty, admitted scope, and obstruction was a single pre-indictment episode—this is an "extraordinary" case warranting credit | Government: Obstruction (directing witness intimidation) negates acceptance; not extraordinary | Court: Affirmed denial—obstructive conduct after detention and before plea precluded acceptance credit; not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2008) (defendant maintains a drug house by exercising control and directing others there)
- United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375 (1st Cir. 2015) (sales over months plus drug paraphernalia support § 2D1.1(b)(12))
- United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2013) ("tools of the trade" indicate principal drug use of premises)
- United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699 (8th Cir. 2012) (active participation in sales and accepting payment at property supports enhancement)
- United States v. Sanchez, 810 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2016) (premises may serve dual primary uses; drug distribution need not be sole use)
- United States v. Bell, 766 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2014) (application of § 2D1.1(b)(12) where residence also used for distribution)
- United States v. Johnson, 737 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding enhancement where part of home used to store drugs for distribution)
- United States v. Ewing, 129 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 1997) (obstruction enhancement creates presumption against acceptance credit)
- United States v. Lallemand, 989 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1993) (extraordinary case where defendant retracted instruction to obstruct immediately after arrest)
- United States v. Bennett, 708 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2013) (guilty plea alone does not require acceptance credit)
- United States v. Davis, 442 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 2006) (denial of acceptance credit upheld where defendant did not negate obstruction effects)
- United States v. Krasinski, 545 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2008) (acceptance-of-responsibility is a factual finding reviewed for clear error)