United States v. Cedrin Farodd Carter, 969 F.3d 1239

In 2009 Carter pleaded guilty in Alabama state court to two counts of distributing controlled substances: one count for cocaine and one for marijuana.
The marijuana count alone alleged location-based sentencing enhancements for sales within three miles of a school and of public housing; the cocaine count lacked those enhancements.
During the plea colloquy the prosecutor narrated a factual basis (stating sales in March and April), but that narration came after Carter pleaded guilty and contained at least one factual mismatch with the indictment.
Years later, after a federal conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, the government sought an ACCA enhancement, treating the 2009 cocaine and marijuana convictions as two separate predicate felonies (plus a third prior), which would trigger ACCA.
Carter argued the two 2009 convictions arose from the same occasion and thus should count as a single ACCA predicate; the district court found the convictions were for separate occasions and applied ACCA.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the indictment’s exclusive application of mandatory location-based enhancements to the marijuana count makes it more likely than not the offenses occurred at different places (and therefore on different occasions).

Issue	Carter's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the 2009 cocaine and marijuana convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another" under ACCA	The two convictions may reflect the same criminal episode (possibly same time/place); prosecutor’s factual proffer was not confirmed by Carter, so government lacks reliable evidence of different occasions	The charging documents and plea colloquy support treating them as separate offenses for ACCA; district court reasonably relied on the transcript	Affirmed: More likely than not the offenses were separate occasions because the indictment charged location-based enhancements only for the marijuana offense, implying different locations (and thus different occasions)
Whether the prosecutor’s post-plea factual narrative in the colloquy qualifies as a Shepard-confirmed factual basis	Carter: The proffer came after he pleaded guilty and was not confirmed by him, so it should not be treated as reliable Shepard evidence	Gov: The plea transcript and prosecutor’s statements can be used to show separate occasions	Court declined to rely solely on that proffer; it noted doubts whether Carter “confirmed” the proffer but affirmed on the independent ground of the indictment’s enhancement allegations

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits admissible records for categorical/recidivist inquiry to specified charging and plea documents)
United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2009) (ACCA’s "different occasions" requires successive, not simultaneous, offenses)
United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684 (11th Cir. 1998) (small gaps in time/place can suffice to separate criminal episodes)
United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2013) (offenses close in time/place may still be distinct occasions)
United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2010) (Shepard-document rule applied in ACCA context)
United States v. McCloud, 818 F.3d 591 (11th Cir. 2016) (government must prove by a preponderance that prior convictions arose from distinct crimes)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (cautions against reliance on prosecutor statements prone to error for categorical analyses)
Castillo v. United States, 816 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2016) (appellate courts may affirm on any ground supported by the record)
Vann v. State, 880 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (both offenses would receive mandatory location-based enhancements if sold within specified proximity)