United States v. Cecilio Shilon-Mendez, 688 F. App'x 245

Defendant Cecilio Shilon-Mendez appealed a 16-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for illegal reentry based on a prior Florida conviction for resisting an officer with violence (Fla. Stat. § 843.01).
Section 2L1.2 grants a 16-level enhancement for prior convictions that are "crimes of violence," defined either by enumeration or as offenses whose elements include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.
The Fifth Circuit applies the categorical approach to decide whether a prior conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence."
The central question was whether Florida’s offense of resisting an officer with violence necessarily involves the use of physical force (so as to satisfy § 2L1.2’s "physical force" clause) and whether it meets the guideline’s "intentional" requirement.
The panel relied on prior Fifth Circuit decisions (Ramos-Bonilla and Alonzo-Garcia) that construed "violence" to include the use of physical force and on Eleventh Circuit authority (Romo-Villalobos) treating § 843.01 as a general-intent crime.
The court affirmed, holding that the Florida resisting statute is a "crime of violence" under § 2L1.2 and satisfies the intentionality requirement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Fla. Stat. § 843.01 is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2	Shilon-Mendez: The statute's term "violence" does not necessarily require physical force; thus it is not a crime of violence	Government: "Violence" in the statute includes the use of physical force, so the offense meets the guideline's physical-force clause	Affirmed — § 843.01 qualifies as a crime of violence because "violence" encompasses physical force
Whether § 843.01 satisfies § 2L1.2's "intentional" requirement	Shilon-Mendez: The offense may lack the necessary intentional element required by § 2L1.2	Government: Florida law treats § 843.01 as a general-intent crime distinct from accidental or strict-liability offenses	Affirmed — § 843.01 meets the intentionality requirement as a general-intent crime

United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir.) (describing application of the categorical approach)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishing the categorical approach for prior convictions)
United States v. Ramos-Bonilla, [citation="558 F. App'x 440"] (5th Cir.) (holding Fla. § 843.01 is a crime of violence under § 2L1.2)
United States v. Alonzo-Garcia, [citation="542 F. App'x 412"] (5th Cir.) (defining "violence" in a Florida aggravated-assault context to include physical force)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (construing "violent" to connote a substantial degree of force under the ACCA)
Romo-Villalobos v. United States, 674 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir.) (treating § 843.01 as a general-intent crime and a crime of violence)