United States v. Castillo
896 F.3d 141
2d Cir.2018Background
- In 2006 Castillo was convicted in Bronx County of first-degree manslaughter under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) (intent to cause serious physical injury resulting in death).
- In 2015 Castillo was arrested for possessing a firearm; he pleaded guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
- At sentencing the parties disputed whether Castillo's 2006 manslaughter conviction qualified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 for a career-offender enhancement and which edition of the Guidelines (Nov. 2015 or Aug. 2016) applied (Ex Post Facto concern).
- The government initially conceded in district court that the Guidelines' "residual clause" was void for vagueness (following Johnson), and therefore relied only on the force clause and the Application Note 1 enumeration (which lists "manslaughter").
- The district court concluded the prior New York conviction was not a "crime of violence" under the Nov. 2015 Guidelines and sentenced Castillo to 19 months (within the lower range). The government appealed.
- The Second Circuit held the government had not waived residual-clause arguments, defined the generic meaning of "manslaughter" to include reckless killings, concluded New York § 125.20(1) is narrower (requires intent to cause serious injury), and found the district court erred in its Guidelines calculation; the case was remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Castillo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Did the government waive reliance on the Guidelines' residual clause by conceding vagueness below? | Not waived; may press residual-clause arguments on appeal. | Government conceded residual clause void; court should not consider it. | Government did not waive; Beckles later held vagueness challenge to advisory Guidelines unavailable. |
| 2. What is the generic definition of "manslaughter" for § 4B1.2 purposes? | Generic manslaughter includes reckless killings (and more culpable states). | Castillo urged narrower meaning (e.g., intent to kill or only voluntary manslaughter). | Generic manslaughter includes unlawful killing recklessly (floor mens rea = recklessness). |
| 3. Are the elements of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) coextensive with generic manslaughter? | § 125.20(1) (intent to cause serious physical injury) is at least as culpable and thus qualifies under the enumeration. | §125.20(1) differs from generic manslaughter or is broader (e.g., can be by omission); district court found no match. | §125.20(1) is narrower (requires intent to cause serious injury) than generic manslaughter (which includes recklessness), so it qualifies under the enumeration. |
| 4. Was the district court’s Guidelines calculation erroneous and requiring resentencing? | Yes; prior conviction is a listed "crime of violence," so career-offender range differs. | Sentence under Nov. 2015 was correct because prior conviction not a crime of violence. | District court erred; vacated sentence and remanded for resentencing (court to choose which Guidelines edition applies and consider harmlessness). |
Key Cases Cited
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (advisory Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge under Due Process)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (categorical/modified categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (generic-offense inquiry for enumerated offenses)
- Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (Ex Post Facto considerations in choosing Guidelines edition)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (limits on comparing statute elements versus means)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (harmlessness and prejudice from Guidelines calculation errors)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standard of review for sentencing reasonableness)