442 F.Supp.3d 479
D.P.R.2020Background
- Defendant Alejandro Carrasco, a long‑time municipal attorney and outside consultant, was indicted on July 8, 2014 for soliciting bribes under 18 U.S.C. § 666 (four counts). After a six‑day trial a jury convicted him on all counts.
- Carrasco had written contracts with the municipalities of Río Grande, Barceloneta, and Juncos to provide legal services and related consulting; he was paid both hourly and on a percentage basis for collections.
- Juan Carlos Mercado, an environmental engineer, obtained municipal contracts in those towns and made recurring payments to Carrasco (checks and cash). Trial evidence showed Mercado paid Carrasco at least ~$180,000–$201,980 between 2008–2011, with some payments documented by checks bearing misleading memo lines.
- Mercado was arrested, cooperated with the FBI, and recorded conversations with Carrasco that discussed disguising payments, invoking privilege, statute‑of‑limitations concerns, and fear of investigation—evidence the jury found probative of corrupt intent and concealment.
- Carrasco moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 for judgment of acquittal arguing (1) he was not an "agent" under § 666, (2) lack of corrupt intent, (3) no official act/authority, and (4) payments were gratuities not bribes. The district court denied the Rule 29 motion and scheduled sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Carrasco was an “agent” under § 666 | Gov’t: written contracts and Carrasco’s role representing municipalities in court and advising officials made him an agent. | Carrasco: merely outside counsel/independent contractor, not an agent. | Court: Denied acquittal — contracts and functions satisfied § 666(d)(1); labels in contracts irrelevant. |
| Whether evidence showed corrupt intent to be influenced | Gov’t: payments, recordings, concealment, and quid‑pro‑quo statements show intent. | Carrasco: no corrupt intent; Mercado unreliable and biased. | Court: Denied acquittal — credibility is for jury; record reasonably supports corrupt intent. |
| Whether an "official act" or authority over contracts was required | Gov’t: § 666 requires intent to be influenced, not proof of control over funds or specific official acts. | Carrasco: he lacked authority to award or control municipal contracts, so bribery elements not met. | Court: Denied acquittal — § 666 does not require authority to allocate funds; agreement to be influenced suffices. |
| Whether payments were bribery or noncriminal gratuities | Gov’t: payments solicited before/around contracts and repeated as quid‑pro‑quo, not mere rewards. | Carrasco: timing uncertain; payments were gratuities not tied to promises. | Court: Denied acquittal — evidence supports quid‑pro‑quo agreement; payments were bribes. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Sotomayor‑Vázquez, 249 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001) (outside consultants with representative duties can be § 666 agents)
- Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (U.S. 2004) (purpose of § 666 is to protect integrity of federal funds)
- Sun‑Diamond Growers v. United States, 526 U.S. 408 (U.S. 1999) (distinguishing bribery from gratuities based on intent to influence)
- United States v. Fernández, 733 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) (quid pro quo and agent liability under § 666)
- United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150 (1st Cir. 1993) (gratuity versus bribe hinges on payor’s intent to effect quid pro quo)
- United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (quid pro quo may be promised before and paid after official action)