314 F. Supp. 3d 272
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Brian Carr was convicted in 2003 of five counts of bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and sentenced to 262 months after being designated a career offender under the (then-mandatory) Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 based on two prior federal bank-robbery convictions.
- The career-offender classification relied on the Guidelines’ definition of “crime of violence,” which included an elements clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)) and a residual clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(2)). The latter was later challenged as vague.
- After Johnson v. United States and Welch, defendants sought collateral relief attacking residual clauses; Carr filed a second § 2255 motion post-Welch/Beckles (treated as a timely supplemental petition under district standing orders).
- Beckles held that the advisory Guidelines’ residual clause is not subject to vagueness challenges; Carr argued Beckles does not foreclose challenges to mandatory Guidelines that applied at his sentencing or that his designation depended on the residual clause.
- The Court assumed, without deciding procedural/timeliness questions, that Carr’s vagueness challenge could proceed but resolved the motion on the merits by examining whether Carr’s prior bank-robbery convictions qualify as crimes of violence under the elements clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)).
- The Court held federal bank robbery under § 2113(a) categorically satisfies § 4B1.2(a)(1): (1) the statute requires at least general intent/knowledge that the defendant’s conduct would intimidate (not mere negligence), and (2) intimidation sufficient to satisfy § 2113(a) necessarily involves violent (physical) force as required by Curtis Johnson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carr) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Guidelines’ residual clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(2)) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Carr | Beckles doesn't apply to pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines; mandatory Guidelines are subject to vagueness; residual clause is void under Johnson/Sheffield | Beckles bars vagueness challenges to the advisory Guidelines; procedural/time bars and Johnson was specific to ACCA residual clause | Court assumed timeliness but did not decide; resolution unnecessary because alternative clause controls |
| Whether Carr’s prior § 2113(a) bank-robbery convictions qualify as crimes of violence under the elements clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)) | § 2113(a)’s “intimidation” can be satisfied by negligent or non-violent threats, so it may not require the intentional threatened use of violent physical force | § 2113(a) requires at least general intent/knowledge that conduct would intimidate and courts should reject far-fetched nonviolent hypotheticals | Held: § 2113(a) categorically requires knowledge that conduct would intimidate and involves threats/use of violent physical force, so it qualifies under § 4B1.2(a)(1) |
| Whether the elements clause requires subjective intent/knowledge rather than recklessness or negligence | Carr contends intimidation can be found under an objective standard regardless of subjective intent | Government: Supreme Court and circuit precedent interpret § 2113(a) to require general intent/knowledge; objective facts permit inference of knowledge | Held: § 2113(a) requires at least general intent/knowledge; objective measures permit inference but do not reduce the mental state to negligence |
| Whether threats sufficient for § 2113(a) necessarily constitute "physical/violent force" under Curtis Johnson | Carr argued hypothetical nonviolent intimidations (poison, minor pinching) show § 2113(a) can be committed without violent physical force | Government: such hypotheticals are unrealistic; intimidation sufficient to induce compliance in bank-robbery context will ordinarily involve violent physical force | Held: Hypothetical nonviolent means are implausible; § 2113(a) categorically requires threatened or used violent physical force and thus meets § 4B1.2(a)(1) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (held "physical force" means violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (held advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (rendered Guidelines advisory)
- Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (interpreted § 2113(a) to require proof of general intent/knowledge as to intimidation)