United States v. Carpenter, 781 F.3d 599

Carpenter was convicted of mail and wire fraud in 2005; the district court granted a new trial in 2005 and the First Circuit remanded for sentencing in 2007.
A second trial in 2008 again convicted Carpenter; sentencing was repeatedly delayed, with final judgment entered in 2014.
Carpenter pursued extensive post-trial and appellate motions (mistrial, acquittal, new trial) spanning 2008–2013, contributing to substantial delay.
Civil Merrill Lynch litigation (2009–2009) produced documents suggesting Merrill Lynch knew the fund sources, which Carpenter argued bore on his motions.
In 2011 the district court granted a new trial; the government appealed and this court reversed in 2013, remanding for sentencing; sentencing occurred in 2014.
On appeal Carpenter challenges Sixth Amendment speedy-trial protections, Speedy Trial Act compliance, sufficiency of evidence, newly discovered evidence, and sentencing rationale, but the court affirms.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation	Carpenter argues post-trial delay violated his rights.	US contends delay was not prejudicial and not improperly prolonged.	No Sixth Amendment violation; delay not unjustified and prejudice not shown.
Speedy Trial Act compliance for retrial timeline	Carpenter contends clock started improperly and Ends-of-Justice findings were invalid.	US maintains proper interpretation and valid ends-of-justice findings; delays not erroneous.	No STA violation; timing and ends-of-justice findings upheld.
Sufficiency of evidence and theory of fraud	Carpenter argues insufficiency or misdirection between omission vs misrepresentation theory.	US theory centered on affirmative misrepresentations; omission theory not required.	Evidence supported the government’s theory; no acquittal required.
Newly discovered evidence and Merrill Lynch documents	New Merrill Lynch materials could have altered outcome at trial.	District court properly weighed the evidence; not warranting new trial.	denial of new trial based on newly discovered evidence affirmed.
Sentence reasonableness and permissible factors	Carpenter contends sentence procedurally and substantively unreasonable.	Judge’s discretion within guidelines supports sentence; factors cited were proper.	Sentence affirmed as reasonable and within discretion.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (speedy-trial balancing factors)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumed prejudice rises with delay)
Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (tolling of delay for interlocutory review; legitimate reasons weighed)
United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (de novo/clear-error framework for STA denials)
United States v. Zedner, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (on-record STA timing and ends-of-justice findings)