United States v. Carol Ryser, 883 F.3d 1018

Ryser pleaded guilty in 2013 to health-care fraud and filing a false tax return; the guideline range was 30–37 months, but the district court imposed three years of probation instead of imprisonment.
In 2016, while on probation, Ryser participated in an illegal lottery scam that targeted elderly victims who were induced to send money; Ryser received cash, checks, and money orders and forwarded funds to people in the U.S. and Jamaica.
The government did not identify exact amounts Ryser received or forwarded; Ryser stipulated to receiving tens of thousands from at least six victims, including over $26,000 from one victim, and acknowledged cash receipts and bank deposits.
The district court found Ryser violated two probation conditions (committing another crime and associating with persons engaged in criminal activity) and calculated a guideline range for the violations of 4–10 months.
The court revoked probation and sentenced Ryser to 24 months’ imprisonment; Ryser appealed only the sentence (not the violation finding or guideline calculation).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural error: court relied on unsupported factual finding that Ryser “profited”	Ryser: government didn’t prove exact amounts received/kept, so profit finding is unsupported and sentencing on that basis is procedurally erroneous	Government/District Court: stipulations, cash receipts, deposits, and the court’s credibility finding support a reasonable inference Ryser profited	No clear error: district court’s credibility findings and stipulations support profit inference; procedural challenge rejected
Substantive reasonableness of 24‑month sentence (above 4–10 mo. guideline)	Ryser: 24 months is greater than necessary given mitigating factors (age, health, limited role, lack of criminal history)	Court: considered §3553(a) factors, prior guideline range (30–37 months) and that Ryser was shown mercy previously but re-offended; aggravating factors outweigh mitigation	Abuse‑of‑discretion standard not met; sentence substantively reasonable
Alleged improper weighing/double‑counting of factors (mercy and violation accounted for in guideline)	Ryser: court improperly double‑counted probation violation and punished for previously granted mercy	Court: properly considered violation, defiance of probation, and prior leniency as relevant §3553(a) factors; weighing was within wide discretion	No abuse of discretion; consideration of these factors lawful and permissible

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (standard for reviewing sentencing procedural and substantive reasonableness)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. en banc) (clear‑error review of factual findings at sentencing)
United States v. Misquadace, 778 F.3d 717 (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for substantive reasonableness)
United States v. Shepard, 657 F.3d 682 (affirming statutory‑maximum sentence for supervised‑release violation despite lower guideline range)
United States v. Keatings, 787 F.3d 1197 (district court may base sentence on defendant’s failure to comply with probation conditions)
United States v. Ceballos–Santa Cruz, 756 F.3d 635 (district court may consider prior sentencing reductions when imposing sentence for supervised‑release violation)
United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 919 (trial judge’s familiarity with defendant’s history and characteristics informs sentencing)
United States v. Gonzalez, 742 F.3d 815 (district courts have wide latitude in weighing §3553(a) factors)