United States v. Carlos Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6350

Defendant Carlos Dominguez-Maroyoqui pleaded guilty (1996) to a § 111(a) felony for assaulting a federal officer; sentence included a 12-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) treating his prior § 111 conviction as a "crime of violence."
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 defines "crime of violence" either by an enumerated list (e.g., aggravated assault) or as any offense that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another."
The question presented: whether the § 111(a) felony (3-year maximum for conduct beyond "simple assault") categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines.
The government relied on the Guidelines’ force clause and urged that § 111(a) involves use/threat/attempted use of physical force; the defense argued the statute criminalizes nonviolent, minimal-force contact that falls short of "violent force."
The court applied the categorical approach (Descamps) and Johnson’s definition that "physical force" means "violent force" capable of causing physical pain or injury, then compared § 111(a)’s elements to that standard.
Court concluded § 111(a) criminalizes a broader set of conduct (including minimal or de minimis force) than the Guidelines’ force definition, vacated the enhancement, and remanded for resentencing without it.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a § 111(a) felony is a categorical "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2’s force clause	§ 111(a) involves assaulting/resisting a federal officer and thus has as an element the use/threat/attempt of physical force	§ 111(a) criminalizes minimal or nonviolent contact; does not require "violent force" as defined in Johnson	§ 111(a) is not categorically a "crime of violence" because it covers conduct below the Johnson "violent force" threshold
Whether the modified categorical approach can be used if § 111(a) is not categorical match	The government argued prior-categorical Ninth Circuit practice supported application	Defense: after Descamps, modified categorical approach cannot be used if statute is not a categorical match	Descamps controls: modified categorical approach not available; statute must match categorically

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (establishes limits on modified categorical approach)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (defines "physical force" as "violent force" capable of causing physical pain or injury)
United States v. Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.) (holding § 111(b) is a crime of violence)
United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d 1171 (discussing aggravated-assault generic elements)
United States v. Chapman, 528 F.3d 1215 (describing § 111’s assault requirement)
United States v. Sommerstedt, 752 F.2d 1494 (holding § 111 convictions can rest on any level of force)
United States v. Flores-Cordero, 723 F.3d 1085 (holding Johnson’s definition applies to § 2L1.2)
Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010 (categorical-approach principles)