United States v. Calderón, 829 F.3d 84

Background

Calderón was a sales rep/manager at GSM City and later GSM City Supercenter; DEA undercover officers made multiple cash deliveries to GSM City in 2010 and an employee, Angel Delguercio, served as a confidential informant.
In 2012 Calderón testified before a Puerto Rico grand jury and denied ever personally receiving or counting cash; he was later indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 for allegedly falsely testifying.
At trial the government introduced testimony and photos showing Calderón received cash at GSM City; Calderón’s defense argued the grand jury questions were ambiguous and his answers might have referred only to Supercenter.
After conviction, Calderón moved for a new trial alleging Brady/Giglio violations: the government failed to disclose Delguercio’s 2013 theft arrest (impeachment evidence) and failed to disclose problems revealed in a related Florida prosecution involving an officer, Muñoz, and factual misattributions in that case.
The district court held the government should have disclosed Delguercio’s arrest but found no reasonable probability of a different outcome; it rejected Brady/Giglio claims tied to Muñoz and factual inaccuracies, denied grand-jury transcript production, and denied a new trial.
Calderón appealed; the First Circuit affirmed, concluding the withheld material was cumulative or immaterial and the grand jury claim was harmless given the guilty verdict.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether nondisclosure of Delguercio’s arrest required a new trial under Giglio/Brady	Delguercio’s arrest was impeaching evidence that would have undermined his testimony implicating Calderón at Supercenter and supported Calderón’s ambiguity defense	District court: nondisclosure was at most cumulative because defense had already impeached Delguercio about motive/benefit; not reasonably probable to change outcome	Court: No abuse of discretion; disclosure should have occurred but there was not a reasonable probability of a different verdict
Whether information from Florida case (Muñoz conviction/plea negotiations) constituted Brady/Giglio material for Calderón’s trial	Muñoz’s misconduct and plea negotiations tainted the grand jury and were material impeachment/exculpatory evidence the government should have produced	Government: Muñoz was not involved in Puerto Rico proceedings, did not testify, and prosecutors likely lacked the information at trial; even if known it was immaterial	Court: No Brady/Giglio violation; Muñoz’s matters were unrelated/immaterial and likely unknown to prosecutors at trial
Whether inaccurate testimony before the Florida grand jury fatally tainted the Puerto Rico grand jury/indictment	Inaccurate attributions in Florida grand jury (officer vs. informant) and related problems infected the Puerto Rico indictment, denying due process	Government: Florida errors did not undermine probable cause or the integrity of the Puerto Rico proceedings; petit jury verdict cures grand-jury error	Court: Rejected due-process/grand-jury-taint claim; Mechanik rule makes grand-jury errors harmless after conviction
Whether the court abused its discretion in denying production of the sealed Puerto Rico grand jury transcript	Calderón claimed particularized need to inspect transcript to prove Brady/Giglio and grand-jury taint	Government and court: secrecy of grand jury must be preserved absent compelling, particularized need; no such need shown	Court: Affirmed denial; no particularized need established and indictment challenge lacked merit

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of favorable material violates due process when material to guilt or punishment)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Brady duty includes evidence useful for impeaching government witnesses)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality standard: suppression undermines confidence in outcome if reasonable probability of different result)
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (conviction renders most grand-jury errors harmless)
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983) (presumption of grand-jury secrecy; release requires compelling necessity)
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (longstanding policy maintaining secrecy of grand-jury proceedings)