United States v. Burgos
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25580
| 1st Cir. | 2012Background
- Burgos, a Worcester police officer, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana.
- Ramos operated a marijuana distribution network from G & V General Auto Repair; Burgos’s brother‑in‑law worked there and Burgos frequented the shop for repairs.
- Ramos testified he gathered customers and met with them at G & V; Burgos allegedly knew of or could be willfully blind to Ramos’s drug activity.
- Surveillance by multiple agencies focused on Ramos and G & V; Burgos’s marked police vehicle was seen near G & V, but surveillance did not target Burgos.
- A wiretap captured Ramos’s conversations about police surveillance; Burgos was instructed to “take it easy” when police were watching.
- The district court instructed the jury on willful blindness; Burgos challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the instruction; the court denied the Rule 29 motion; the appeal followed, resulting in reversal and acquittal on the conspiracy charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Knowledge vs. willful blindness | Burgos had knowledge or willful blindness to Ramos’s drug activity | Prosecution showed sufficient circumstantial evidence | Insufficient evidence for knowledge/willful blindness; conviction vacated |
| Willful blindness instruction | Instruction properly stated knowledge standard | Instruction correctly framed willful blindness as knowledge proxy | Instruction improper as applied; not necessary to reach third element and supports reversal |
| Cumulative evidence standard | Cumulative inferences support knowledge | Individual inferences insufficient; no high probability knowledge established | Cumulative inferences do not establish knowledge beyond reasonable doubt; reversal on knowledge element |
Key Cases Cited
- Pérez-Meléndez v. United States, 599 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2010) (need for knowledge of a controlled substance, not just illegality, is required with willful blindness)
- DeLutis v. United States, 722 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1983) (prohibits piling inference upon inference; conspiratorial knowledge cannot be inferred from speculative inferences)
- Flores-Rivera v. United States, 56 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 1995) (equal or nearly equal theories of guilt and innocence require reversal when only speculative inferences support guilt)
- United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1987) (definition challenges of reasonable-doubt standard; conceptual guidance for proof beyond reasonable doubt)
- Morgan v. Dickhaut, 677 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2012) (describes level of certainty required for a criminal conviction under reasonable doubt standard)