United States v. Bryshun Furlow
928 F.3d 311
| 4th Cir. | 2019Background
- Defendant Bryshun Furlow pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine and to being a felon in possession of a firearm; district court sentenced him to 180 months after applying ACCA and Guidelines career-offender enhancements.
- Government relied on prior convictions: Georgia (2003 drug convictions and two 2008 first-degree arsons) and South Carolina (2016 felony distribution of crack cocaine). The PSR counted the two Georgia drug convictions as one ACCA predicate and the two Georgia arson convictions as one ACCA predicate.
- District court applied the modified categorical approach, reviewing state-court plea and related documents (Shepard documents) to determine which statutory alternatives formed the basis of the prior convictions.
- For South Carolina §44-53-375(B), the court concluded the statute is divisible and that Furlow pleaded guilty to distribution of crack cocaine, which matches federal definitions of a “serious drug offense” (ACCA) and a “controlled substance offense” (Guidelines).
- For Georgia first-degree arson (Ga. Code Ann. §16-7-60(a)(1)), the district court found the offenses matched generic arson; on appeal Furlow raised a mens rea challenge (arguing the statute is broader than generic arson), reviewed for plain error.
- Fourth Circuit affirmed: it held the South Carolina statute divisible and the plea established a qualifying distribution offense, and rejected Furlow’s mens rea/plain-error challenge to the Georgia arson predicates.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether S.C. §44-53-375(B) is divisible and whether Furlow’s conviction is a qualifying drug predicate | Furlow: §44-53-375(B) is a single offense listing alternative means (including purchase), so it does not categorically match ACCA/Guidelines drug predicates | Government: statute is divisible; Shepard documents show Furlow pleaded to distribution, which matches federal definitions | Court: statute is divisible; plea transcript shows conviction for distribution of crack; conviction is a qualifying ACCA and Guidelines predicate |
| Whether Georgia first-degree arson convictions qualify as "arson" predicates (mens rea/plain error) | Furlow: GA statute sweeps more broadly (aiding/causing another to burn) and lacks a maliciousness requirement, so it exceeds generic arson; raised on appeal (not preserved below) | Government: Georgia statute’s elements (including knowingly damaging a dwelling by fire or causing/abetting another to do so) correspond to generic arson; lower courts and other circuits support qualification | Court: on plain-error review, no clear or obvious error; GA convictions qualify as generic arson predicates for ACCA and Guidelines |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (explains elements v. means and when modified categorical approach applies)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits sentencing courts to certain state-court documents when statute is divisible)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (definition and use of "generic" offenses for predicate analysis)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (identifies documents courts may consult under the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2010) (discusses generic arson in the Guidelines context)