United States v. Bryant Love, 7 F.4th 674

Bryant Love pleaded guilty to multiple drug counts and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm; officers found drugs in the kitchen and two guns/ammunition ~15 feet away.
The government sought application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 15‑year mandatory minimum based on three prior convictions: 1994 Illinois armed robbery; 2009 federal crack distribution; 2015 Indiana Class D battery causing bodily injury.
The district court found the 1994 armed robbery and the 2009 federal drug conviction qualified as ACCA predicates, but held the 2015 Indiana battery did not, so the ACCA mandatory minimum was not applied.
The district court applied a four‑level USSG §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement (possession “in connection with” drug trafficking) and sentenced Love to 96 months concurrent; both parties appealed.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the restoration‑of‑rights ("mousetrap") factual finding for clear error and the ACCA elements issue de novo; it affirmed that Love did not prove restoration, and it held the Indiana battery conviction does qualify as an ACCA violent felony.
Court reversed and remanded for resentencing under the ACCA; it declined to reach two other sentencing issues because ACCA resentencing renders them unnecessary.

Issue	Love's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Love's 1994 Illinois armed robbery is excluded under §921(a)(20) ("mousetrap"/restoration of civil rights)	He received a restoration‑of‑rights letter that omitted a firearms disability, so the prior conviction should not count	No such letter was proved; state practice and DOC records show no such restoration notice	District court's factual finding not clearly erroneous; armed robbery counts as ACCA predicate
Whether 2015 Indiana Class D battery (resulting in bodily injury) qualifies as an ACCA "violent felony" under the elements clause	The statute allows conviction on a mere unwanted touching and thus does not categorically require the "physical force" ACCA demands	The felony requires bodily injury, which means the touching was capable of causing pain/injury and therefore satisfies ACCA's physical‑force requirement	Conviction qualifies under the elements clause; counts as ACCA predicate
Whether the §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) four‑level enhancement (possessed firearm "in connection with" drug trafficking) was supported	Judge erred; government failed to demonstrate connection	Government argued enhancement was proper	Not reached (remanded for ACCA resentencing)
Whether district judge erred by considering pending charges when departing/upwardly varying without specific written reasons	Departure/variance was improper or inadequately explained	Government argued issue moot if ACCA applies	Not reached (remanded for ACCA resentencing)

Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" in ACCA as violent force capable of causing pain/injury)
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (robbery requiring overcoming resistance satisfies ACCA elements clause; low threshold of force suffices)
Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (distinguishes mere offensive touching from violent force; discusses intent/likelihood framework)
Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (anti‑mousetrap doctrine and §921(a)(20) analysis)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical approach and analysis of divisible statutes)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits to categorical/modiﬁed categorical approaches)
United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (force capable of causing pain/injury includes common assaults such as hitting/slapping)
United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2016) (a slap suffices under Curtis Johnson standard)