United States v. Bryant
237 F. Supp. 3d 379
W.D. Va.2017Background
- Bryant was sentenced in 2013 to 188 months for being a felon in possession of a firearm, enhanced under the ACCA to a 15-year mandatory minimum based on three prior Virginia statutory burglary convictions (2009) plus other prior convictions.
- He did not object to the PSR or appeal his sentence.
- After Johnson v. United States (2015) struck down the ACCA residual clause and Welch made Johnson retroactive, Bryant filed a § 2255 petition (June 23, 2016) challenging the ACCA enhancement.
- The government conceded two West Virginia breaking-and-entering convictions were not ACCA predicates but argued Bryant’s Virginia statutory burglaries were enumerated ACCA predicates.
- The district court analyzed Virginia Code § 18.2-90/91 under the categorical/modified categorical framework (Taylor, Descamps, Mathis) and concluded the Virginia statutory burglary statute is broader than generic burglary and indivisible for ACCA purposes.
- Because Bryant’s Virginia convictions qualified only via the now-invalid residual clause, the court granted § 2255 relief, vacated the ACCA enhancement, and ordered resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under § 2255(f) | Johnson announced a new right; filed within one year of Johnson/Welch | Petition untimely; Johnson irrelevant if convictions are enumerated offenses | Timely under § 2255(f)(3); Welch made Johnson retroactive, so Bryant filed within one year |
| Procedural default / cause and prejudice | Johnson was a novel rule not reasonably available before; causes excusing default; prejudice shown by increased sentence | Claim defaulted because not raised earlier | Default excused: cause (novelty of Johnson) and prejudice (sentence difference) established |
| Whether Virginia statutory burglary is an ACCA enumerated "generic burglary" | Virginia burglary is broader than Taylor’s generic burglary and thus cannot qualify as enumerated offense | Virginia statutory burglary is divisible / contains alternatives that can match generic burglary | § 18.2-90/91 is broader than generic burglary and indivisible under Mathis; cannot be treated as an enumerated offense |
| Use of modified categorical approach | Not available because § 18.2-90 lists alternative means (places) rather than alternative elements; courts cannot consult Shepard documents to narrow conviction to generic burglary | Government argued statute divisible (citing Foster) so modified categorical approach applies | Modified categorical approach inapplicable; statute indivisible for ACCA purposes, so convictions only qualified via residual clause (now invalid) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson is retroactive on collateral review)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defined generic burglary for ACCA and established categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limited modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (clarified divisibility; distinguished elements from means)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (applied residual clause to include non-generic burglary; later overruled as to residual clause by Johnson)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limited documents courts may consult under the modified categorical approach)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (cause-and-prejudice framework for excusing procedural default)