United States v. Bryant, 991 F.3d 452

In 2007 Charles Bryant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute >50 grams of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 300 months' imprisonment.
The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) raised crack thresholds but was not retroactive to pre-2010 sentences; Dorsey established its limited retroactivity.
The First Step Act (2018) contains: §404(b) (permits resentencing “as if” sections 2–3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect) and §401(a) (narrowed the §841(b)(1)(A) enhancement to require a prior "serious drug felony").
§401(c) makes the §401(a) amendment retroactive only for offenses committed before enactment if a sentence for the offense had not yet been imposed as of enactment.
Bryant obtained a §404(b) resentencing in district court and his sentence was reduced to 216 months; he argued on appeal he should also benefit from §401(a)’s narrower enhancement at resentencing.
The district court declined to apply §401(a); the Second Circuit affirmed, holding §401(c) bars retroactive application to defendants already sentenced and §404(b) does not oblige applying unrelated statutory changes.

Issue	Bryant's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether §401(a)’s narrowing of §841(b)(1)(A) applies at a §404(b) resentencing when the original sentence was imposed before the First Step Act	Resentencing under §404(b) requires applying intervening statutory changes like §401(a), which would reduce his Guidelines	§401(c) limits §401(a)’s retroactivity to offenses without sentences imposed at enactment; §404(b) only applies Fair Sentencing Act changes	§401(a) does not apply; §401(c) precludes relief for defendants sentenced before enactment
Whether §404(b) requires plenary resentencing or recalculation of Guidelines beyond changes from Fair Sentencing Act §§2–3	Resentencing must recalculates Guidelines to reflect intervening laws generally	§404(b) permits resentencing only "as if" §§2–3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect; it does not mandate plenary resentencing	§404(b) does not require plenary resentencing; only recalculation for changes flowing from §§2–3

United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020) (First Step Act resentencing is not plenary; recalc only for Fair Sentencing Act changes)
United States v. Thompson, 961 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting §401(c) limits retroactivity for defendants sentenced before enactment)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (Fair Sentencing Act retroactivity scheme)
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Balt. & O. R. R. Co., 331 U.S. 519 (1947) (statutory headings cannot override plain text)
United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 2020) (de novo review for statutory-interpretation issues)