United States v. Bryant
976 F.3d 165
| 2d Cir. | 2020Background:
- Bryant pled guilty to (1) conspiracy to distribute 28+ grams of cocaine base (21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(B)) and (2) being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)); plea limited aggregate term to ≤10 years.
- FBI evidence tied Bryant to a Putney, VT drug operation, multiple controlled buys, a shootout on Aug. 26, 2016, and a Ruger .40 seized at the residence; witnesses reported Bryant displaying firearms.
- Bryant’s predicate felony was a 2007 Virginia grand larceny conviction with a three-year prison sentence suspended in favor of probation (no actual incarceration served).
- At sentencing the PSR calculated offense level 33, CHC III (Guidelines 168–210 mos.); court reduced to CHC II and varied to an offense level producing a Guidelines range of 87–108 mos., then imposed 90 months’ imprisonment and 4 years’ supervised release.
- On appeal Bryant challenged: (A) his § 922(g) plea in light of Rehaif (knowledge-of-status element); (B) procedural and substantive reasonableness of the 90‑month sentence; and (C) two supervised‑release conditions—the risk‑notification condition and the restriction on communications with known felons (as applied to his brother).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Bryant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether Bryant’s § 922(g) guilty plea is invalid after Rehaif because he was not advised of the knowledge‑of‑status element | Rehaif adds a knowledge element but plain‑error review applies; the record (Virginia judgment + facts) establishes Bryant knew his felon status and he would have pleaded anyway given plea benefits and overlapping § 924(c) exposure | Bryant contends he may not have known his prior conviction was punishable by >1 year (suspended sentence, remote in time) and would have insisted on trial if told of the element | Affirmed. Plain‑error review: omission was error but Bryant cannot show reasonable probability he would have refused the plea—state judgment and sentencing history show he knew status; overlapping § 924(c) and plea benefits made trial unlikely. |
| 2) Whether the 90‑month sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable | Government: district court considered Guidelines and §3553(a), addressed co‑defendant disparities and aggravating role/violence, and the sentence is within the reasonable range | Bryant: court failed to meaningfully compare co‑defendants and sentence is disproportionately severe | Affirmed. No procedural error (no obligation to equalize co‑defendant sentences); sentence not substantively unreasonable—falls at low end of district court’s adopted Guidelines range after variance. |
| 3) Whether the risk‑notification condition is invalid (delegation/vagueness) | Government concedes district court’s oral modification (judicial pre‑approval) governs and asks remand to reflect written judgment; condition not ripe for vagueness challenge | Bryant: original clause improperly delegated authority to probation and amended clause remains vague (terms like “risk,” “personal history”) | Partially affirmed/remanded. Court remands to incorporate oral modification into written judgment; vagueness challenge unripe so condition stands pending future use. |
| 4) Whether the communication condition (bar on contacting known felons) is vague or unreasonable as applied to contact with his brother | Government: standard condition; prior precedents uphold association limits; any family exceptions left to probation discretion unless court finds otherwise | Bryant: condition is vague and, as applied, improperly restricts protected familial association with his brother without required findings | Vacated in part and remanded. Condition is not facially vague, but because it implicates an immediate familial relationship the district court must either justify the restriction with findings or exempt communications with the brother; remand for further proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (Supreme Court held §922(g) requires government to prove defendant knew he belonged to forbidden status)
- Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (standard for prejudice in Rule 11 plain‑error guilty‑plea challenges)
- United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (failure to allege knowledge‑of‑status in charging document is not jurisdictional)
- United States v. Miller, 954 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 2020) (prior actual incarceration >1 year supports conclusion defendant knew felon status post‑Rehaif)
- United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2005) (heightened due‑process analysis when supervised‑release condition implicates familial association)
- United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2013) (§3553(a)(6) requires consideration of national disparities but not disparities among co‑defendants)
- United States v. Albanese, 554 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding conditions restricting association with persons having criminal records)
- United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015) (limits delegation of decisions that effectively determine a defendant’s liberty to probation officers)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain‑error analysis: fourth prong need not be reached if prejudice prong fails)