United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954

Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (VAWA Reauthorization Act of 2005) to create a federal felony for domestic assault in Indian country by habitual offenders, using prior convictions (Federal, State, or tribal) as predicates.
Michael Bryant, a Northern Cheyenne tribal member, had multiple tribal-court domestic-assault convictions, many resulting in jail terms of ≤1 year; he was not appointed counsel in those tribal proceedings.
ICRA provides tribal defendants appointed counsel only when a sentence exceeds one year; tribal proceedings therefore need not satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Bryant was later indicted under § 117(a); he argued his uncounseled tribal convictions could not serve as § 117(a) predicates because, if they had been state/federal convictions with jail time, they would have violated the Sixth Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed, creating a circuit split with other circuits (8th, 10th) that permit use of valid tribal convictions as § 117(a) predicates.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit: tribal-court convictions that complied with ICRA and were valid when entered may be used as § 117(a) predicates; using them in the federal prosecution did not violate the Sixth or Fifth Amendments.

Issue	Bryant's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether uncounseled tribal-court convictions (with ≤1 year jail) can be used as § 117(a) predicate offenses	Such convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment if rendered by state/federal courts and therefore cannot be used to enhance punishment in a later federal prosecution	Valid tribal convictions that complied with ICRA remain usable as § 117(a) predicates; they did not violate the Sixth Amendment when entered	The Court held they may be used; convictions valid under ICRA retain their validity when used as § 117(a) predicates
Whether Burgett/Tucker exclusion of uncounseled prior convictions applies here	Prior decisions barring use of uncounseled convictions should prevent use of Bryant's tribal convictions	Burgett/Tucker apply only to convictions that were constitutionally invalid when entered; Bryant’s convictions complied with ICRA and were valid	The Court distinguished Burgett/Tucker and applied Nichols: because tribal convictions were valid when entered, their later use does not constitute a new Sixth Amendment violation
Whether use of tribal convictions raises Fifth Amendment due-process or reliability concerns	Uncounseled tribal convictions are less reliable and their use violates due process	ICRA provides procedural safeguards and federal habeas review; no systemic unreliability shown	The Court held ICRA protections and habeas review sufficiently ensure reliability and due process

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent defendants in serious criminal cases)
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (appointment of counsel required when imprisonment is imposed)
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (no right to appointed counsel when sentence is noncustodial)
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) (prior convictions obtained in violation of right to counsel generally may not be used to enhance punishment)
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction valid under Scott may be used to enhance punishment in a later prosecution)
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (invalid prior convictions cannot be relied on at sentencing)
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) (constitutional Bill of Rights limitations generally do not apply to tribal governments)
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (federal jurisdiction over crimes by Indians against Indians requires clear congressional intent)
United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (recidivism and escalation concerns in domestic violence context)