United States v. Brooks
889 F.3d 95
| 2d Cir. | 2018Background
- In 2013 Brooks pled guilty to distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin (Class C felony) and was sentenced in 2014 to 30 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release.
- After release in 2015, Brooks repeatedly tested positive for drugs and missed drug tests; state arrests followed. A revocation petition alleged multiple Grade C violations.
- In October 2016 Brooks pled guilty to three Grade C specifications (multiple marijuana positives, one cocaine positive, and missed tests); he faced a statutory maximum of 2 years' imprisonment on revocation.
- At revocation sentencing the Probation Office recommended 12 months' imprisonment; the court imposed 12 months' imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release, explaining it had given Brooks multiple chances and seeking to ensure ongoing treatment access.
- Brooks appealed, arguing the life term of supervised release was procedurally and substantively unreasonable; the Second Circuit vacated the lifetime supervised-release term and remanded for resentencing on that component.
Issues
| Issue | Brooks' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a lifetime term of supervised release upon first revocation was substantively reasonable | Lifetime supervision is excessive given nonviolent drug-relapse violations | Lifetime supervision is authorized by statute and warranted by repeated violations and need for treatment | Vacated: lifetime term is not reasonable on this record; remand for a shorter term consistent with § 3583(e) factors |
| Whether the district court properly considered statutory sentencing factors (procedural reasonableness) | Court relied on retribution and generalized remarks about "chances," failing to justify extreme term | Court relied on rehabilitative purpose and repeated violations as justification | Vacated in part: court improperly relied in part on retributive rationale and failed to identify distinguishing conduct to justify life term |
| Whether statute permitted imposition of lifetime supervised release on revocation | Brooks acknowledged statute can authorize up to life but argued limitations on its use | Government argued offense statute (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)) permits up to life | Court: Statute can authorize life (per precedent) but authorization does not make it reasonable absent strong justification |
| Whether Brooks' conduct distinguished him from other recidivists so as to justify an extreme departure | Brooks: conduct (drug relapse) is common among recidivists and not unusually dangerous or distinct | Gov.: repeated violations and failures despite interventions justify exceptional supervision | Court: conduct not sufficiently distinguishing (nonviolent, addiction-related); life term atypical and at odds with rehabilitative goals |
Key Cases Cited
- Burden v. United States, 860 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2017) (framework for supervised-release sentencing and § 3553 considerations)
- Aldeen v. United States, 792 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015) (supervised release is rehabilitative, not purely punitive)
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 53 (2000) (purpose of supervised release is to assist reintegration into community)
- Mora v. United States, 22 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1994) (vacating life supervised release where departure from guidelines/statute was unreasonable)
- Cassesse v. United States, 685 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding lifetime supervised release where court adequately explained reasoning and defendant committed new offenses while on release)
- Stevens v. United States, 192 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 1999) (reversing life supervised release where court failed to distinguish defendant from typical recidivist)
- Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011) (retribution cannot justify supervised-release terms)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (abuse-of-discretion standard for sentencing review)