946 F.3d 598
D.C. Cir.2020Background
- Brian Carr was convicted of five counts of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and, at sentencing, the district court treated two prior § 2113(a) convictions as "crimes of violence," making him a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
- The Guidelines then defined "crime of violence" via an elements clause (use/attempted/threatened physical force) and a residual clause (conduct presenting serious risk); the sentencing judge did not state which clause he relied on.
- The Supreme Court later invalidated ACCA’s residual clause in Johnson v. United States, and Carr filed a second § 2255 motion arguing the Guidelines’ identical residual clause was void for vagueness.
- The district court denied relief because Carr’s prior bank-robbery convictions qualify as crimes of violence under the Guidelines’ independent elements clause.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed: applying the categorical approach, it held that § 2113(a) (robbery "by intimidation") necessarily involves threatened physical force and requires at least subjective knowledge that the defendant’s conduct was intimidating.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prior § 2113(a) convictions are "crimes of violence" under the Guidelines' elements clause | Carr: § 2113(a) can encompass nonviolent or non-physical conduct and thus may not meet the elements-clause force requirement | Gov't: "intimidation" in § 2113(a) means putting in fear — a threat of physical force — so convictions categorically meet elements clause | Yes. Bank robbery "by intimidation" categorically involves threatened physical force and qualifies under § 4B1.2(a)(1) |
| Whether Johnson’s invalidation of the residual clause voids Carr’s career-offender status | Carr: the Guidelines' residual clause mirrors ACCA’s and is void, so his enhancement is invalid | Gov't: enhancement can be sustained under the elements clause independent of the residual clause | Court: did not reach the residual-clause constitutional question because elements clause sufficed; enhancement affirmed |
| Mens rea required for the "intimidation" element of § 2113(a) | Carr: statute requires only negligence (objective standard) | Gov't: statute requires at least recklessness or knowledge; Carter supports a general-intent/knowledge requirement | Court: § 2113(a) requires that defendant know his conduct was objectively intimidating (more than negligence) |
| Whether non-contact threats (e.g., poisoning) qualify as "physical force" under the elements clause | Carr: threats that do not involve physical contact may not be "physical force" | Gov't: Supreme Court precedent treats means that cause bodily injury (including poison) as physical force | Court: such threats can satisfy "physical force" because causing bodily injury (even without contact) meets the common-law force requirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (§ 2113(a) carries a general-intent/knowledge requirement as to the actus reus)
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (interpreting common-law robbery force requirement)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (physical force can include means that cause bodily injury, such as poison)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (explaining the categorical approach to offense-elements analysis)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (cautioning against inferring a negligence mens rea where Supreme Court precedent requires more)