Background - Trooper Waycaster stopped Bowman’s red 1998 Lexus at ~3:40 a.m. for weaving and speeding after receiving (but not acting on) a DEA tip; Bowman and passenger Alvarez were questioned and Bowman was issued a warning. - After returning Bowman’s license and registration and a brief consensual 40‑second colloquy in the patrol car, Waycaster told Bowman to “hang tight” while he questioned Alvarez; Bowman did not affirmatively object but did not give explicit renewed consent. - Waycaster then questioned Alvarez, removed him to the patrol car with Bowman, summoned a K‑9, and the dog alerted to the vehicle; a subsequent search yielded methamphetamine, scales, and ammunition. - Bowman moved to suppress, arguing the stop was unlawfully prolonged without consent or reasonable, articulable suspicion; the magistrate judge and district court denied suppression, finding either consent or reasonable suspicion justified the extension. - The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo, concluded the directive to “hang tight” converted the encounter into a non‑consensual seizure, and held Waycaster lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the completed stop; the court vacated Bowman’s conviction and remanded. ### Issues | Issue | Bowman’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held | |---|---:|---|---| | Whether continued detention after returning license/registration was consensual or a seizure | The officer’s instruction to “hang tight” converted the encounter into a non‑consensual seizure; Bowman did not consent to prolongation | Bowman said “okay” earlier when asked if officer could ask follow‑up questions; no force displayed so continued encounter was consensual | The court held the direction to remain in the patrol car was a seizure (not consensual) because a reasonable person would not feel free to leave | | Whether officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to extend the stop before questioning the passenger | Bowman: the facts relied on by the officer (initial nervousness, items in car, inability to name address, recent Craigslist purchases, unemployment) were innocent explanations and insufficient in totality | Government: the cumulative factors justified a reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity and permitted prolongation | Held: No reasonable suspicion—individual factors were innocuous and their totality did not eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers; prolongation was unlawful | | Whether evidence from dog sniff/search must be suppressed due to unlawful prolongation | Presence of contraband resulted from an unconstitutional extension and must be suppressed | Evidence should be admissible because officer had reasonable suspicion or Bowman consented | Held: Because prolongation lacked reasonable suspicion and was non‑consensual, the dog sniff and subsequent search were unlawful; suppression warranted | | Remedy for unlawful seizure and search | Vacatur of conviction and remand for further proceedings | Government opposed vacatur | Held: Conviction vacated and case remanded for proceedings consistent with opinion | ### Key Cases Cited Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (extension of traffic stop requires consent or reasonable suspicion) Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (traffic stops are seizures subject to Fourth Amendment) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops) Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (dog sniff during lawful traffic stop must not prolong stop) Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (reasonable suspicion and probable cause reviewed de novo) United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238 (4th Cir.) (reasonable suspicion required to extend traffic stop for dog sniff) * Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (nervous, evasive behavior may be relevant to reasonable suspicion)