United States v. Brenton Massey
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9619
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendant Brenton Massey pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- Presentence report identified three prior qualifying convictions (two serious drug offenses and one Texas felony under Tex. Penal Code § 38.14), prompting the Government to seek ACCA enhancement (15-year mandatory minimum) under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
- Massey conceded his drug convictions but argued the Texas § 38.14 conviction should not count as a "violent felony" because Texas "force" may be narrower than the "physical force" required by Johnson v. United States.
- § 38.14 criminalizes intentionally or knowingly, with force, taking or attempting to take certain weapons from peace officers with intent to harm the officer or a third person.
- The district court treated § 38.14 as a violent felony and sentenced Massey under the ACCA; Massey appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tex. Penal Code § 38.14 is a "violent felony" under the ACCA | Massey: Texas "force" can mean "violence, compulsion, or constraint" and may permit less than Johnson's "physical force," so § 38.14 may not meet ACCA's force element | Government: § 38.14 at least includes threatened use of physical force (and thus qualifies); prior circuit precedent supports treating weapon-taking offenses as threatening physical force | Court: § 38.14 qualifies because it has as an element the threatened use of physical force; ACCA enhancement affirmed |
| Whether Massey preserved his appellate argument | Massey: refined argument on appeal | Government: argument below differed and review should be plain error | Court: refinement preserved issue; review is de novo |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (interpreting "force" in resisting arrest context as "violence, compulsion, or constraint")
- Finley v. State, 484 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (applied Dobbs definition of "force" to § 38.03 resisting arrest)
- United States v. Garcia-Figueroa, 753 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2014) (taking a firearm from an officer creates sufficient "threatened use of physical force" for ACCA purposes)
- United States v. Avalos-Martinez, 700 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 2012) (interpreting § 38.14 and noting Texas courts could control contrary interpretations)