United States v. Bradley
882 F.3d 390
| 2d Cir. | 2018Background
- John B. Ohle III was convicted of tax evasion and conspiracy; the government obtained a criminal forfeiture order including real and personal property.
- Third parties (Patricia Ohle and related entities) filed petitions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) claiming interests in the forfeited property; the parties settled and the district court entered a consent order in May 2013.
- Two years later the petitioners moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 to vacate the settlement, alleging government fraud/misconduct; the district court denied the Rule 60 motion by order dated August 20, 2015 and said a memorandum of reasons would follow.
- On December 30, 2015 the district court issued a memorandum reaffirming its August 20 denial and explaining its reasoning; the petitioners filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 2016.
- The Second Circuit considered whether (1) § 853(n) ancillary proceedings are civil or criminal for appellate-timing purposes and (2) whether the appeal period began on the August 20 order or the December 30 memorandum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is a § 853(n) ancillary forfeiture proceeding civil or criminal for appellate-timing? | § 853(n) arises from criminal forfeiture and should follow criminal-appellate timing (Rule 4(b)). | § 853(n) is a civil, quiet-title–like proceeding and should follow Rule 4(a) civil timetables. | § 853(n) proceedings are civil for purposes of FRAP 4; Rule 4(a) governs appeals. |
| When does the appeal clock start after denial of a Rule 60 motion: entry of initial order denying the motion (Aug 20) or entry of later memorandum reaffirming that order (Dec 30)? | The clock should start when the district court issues its explanatory memorandum (Dec 30), because the later order clarified reasons. | The clock starts when the dispositive order denying relief was entered on the civil docket (Aug 20); subsequent explanation does not reset the clock absent substantive change. | The appeal period began on Aug 20 when the denial was entered; the Dec 30 memorandum only reaffirmed the prior order and did not restart the clock. |
| Effect of untimely notice of appeal | Appellants argued timeliness based on Dec 30 order. | Government argued appeal was untimely under Rule 4(a)(1)(B). | Appeal untimely under Rule 4(a); court lacks jurisdiction and dismissed appeal. |
| Whether failure to meet Rule 4(b) would be jurisdictional | (Not directly argued by appellants as they claimed Rule 4(a) applied.) | Government noted different consequences if Rule 4(b) governed. | Court explained untimeliness under Rule 4(a) is jurisdictional per 28 U.S.C. § 2107; failure to meet Rule 4(b) would not deprive court of jurisdiction but is not the controlling rule here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc., 802 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing jurisdictional effect of FRAP 4 time limits and statutory basis)
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (holding statutorily prescribed appellate deadlines are jurisdictional)
- United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008) (failure to satisfy Rule 4(b) does not deprive court of jurisdiction)
- United States v. Moser, 586 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing § 853(n) as civil in nature)
- United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding appeals from § 853(n) governed by civil appellate rule)
- United States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1991) (analyzing the distinct role of third-party petitioners in § 853(n) proceedings)
- Perez v. AC Roosevelt Food Corp., 744 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining when a later order can reset the appeal clock)
- Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2011) (clarifying when a subsequent order changes substance of a judgment and restarts appeal period)